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Two Precipices, One Chasm: The
Economics of Physician-Assisted
Suicide and Euthanasia
By NELSON LUND*
Introduction
First, they did no harm. Although invited to invalidate the laws of at
least thirty-five states that prohibit assisting another person to commit sui-
cide, the Supreme Court has produced two decisions whose most salient
feature is judicial restraint. Most obviously, not a single member of the
Court was willing to invalidate either of the statutes at issue in Washington
v. Glucksberg' and Vacco v. Quill.2 This is particularly noteworthy be-
cause the courts of appeals in both cases had struck down the challenged
statutes, using substantive due process in Glucksberg3 and equal protection
analysis in Quill.
A majority of the Justices, moreover, expressed a strong reluctance to
engage in the kind of free-wheeling constitutional adventurism that has
been the source of so many excesses throughout our history. Insisting that
substantive due process is a narrow doctrine, though one now firmly em-
* Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law; Ph.D., Harvard University
1981; J.D., University of Chicago 1985. I am extremely grateful for the helpful, often skeptical,
comments on an earlier draft from Lloyd R. Cohen, Richard A. Epstein, Stephen G. Gilles, Wil-
liam Hurwitz, Leon R. Kass, Mara S. Lund, John 0. McGinnis, Timothy J. Muris, Jeffrey S.
Parker, Larry E. Ribstein, and participants in a John M. Olin workshop in law and economics at
Georgetown University Law Center. Generous financial support was provided through the Law
and Economics Center at George Mason University School of Law, and Milton Johns provided
excellent research assistance. This article builds upon Leon R. Kass and Nelson Lund, Physi-
clan-Assisted Suicide, Medical Ethics, and the Future of the Medical Profession, 35 DUQ. L.
REV. 395 (1996), from which portions of Part I of the present article are adapted.
1. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
2. 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
3. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en bane), rev'd sub
nom. Washington v. Giucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
4. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).
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bedded in our law, the Glucksberg Courit declared that it can be used only
to protect certain precisely described fundamental rights that have deep
and objectively verifiable roots in our Nation's history and traditions5
Finding that the asserted right to assistance in committing suicide is actu-
ally inconsistent with centuries of legal doctrine and practice (which has
not even recognized a right to suicide), the Court refused to set its face
against the continuing refusal of almost every state in the union to legalize
assisted suicide.6 With similar restraint, the Quill Court declined to engage
in the kind of patent sophistry that would be required to conclude that laws
against assisted suicide suffer from some kind of constitutionally objec-
tionable irrationality.!
The Court's judicial restraint in these cases also had another aspect,
however, and one from which proponents of assisted suicide can take more
comfort. Although the Glucksberg majority was unwilling to declare a
sweeping new constitutional right, it did not rule out the possibility of its
ever deciding to insulate some would-be suicide "assisters" from govern-
ment interference. Some members of the Court insisted on characterizing
the decision merely as a rejection of a facial challenge to the statutes at is-
sue,8 and even the majority was forced to concede that a new challenge
framed in different terms could conceivably produce a different outcome.9
In the short run, the technical narrowness of the Court's decision is proba-
bly of little moment. Only Justice Stevens expressed a strong itch to begin
the process of judicially supervising the nation's approach to assisted sui-
cide.10 Justice O'Connor, who provided the fifth vote for the majority
5. See 117 S. Ct. at 2268.
6. See id at 2268-75.
7. Rejecting the analysis of the court below, the Supreme Court held that New York law,
which permits patients to refuse lifesaving medical treatment but forbids physicians to assist their
patients in committing suicide, is not making a distinction that is "arbitrary" or "irrational." See
Quill 117 S. Ct. at 2295. The distinction between letting a patient die and making that patient
die, said the Court, is both "important and logical; it is certainly rational." See id. at 2298.
8. See Quill, 117 S. CL at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also id. at 2310 (Stevens,
J., concurring in the judgments); see also id. (Ginsberg, J., concurring in the judgments) (indi-
cating "substantial" agreement with O'Connor's opinion); see also id. (Breyer, J., concurring in
the judgments) (joining O'Connor's opinion except insofar as she joined the majority opinions).
9. See Glucksberg 117 S. CL at 2275 n.24 (noting that the Court's Glucksberg opinion
does not "absolutely foreclose" the possibility that a plaintiff might prevail on a "more particu-
larized challenge," but asserting that such a claim would have to be "quite different" from the
claims in Glucksberg).
10. See, e.g., id. at 2305 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgments):
[Just as our conclusion that capital punishment is not always unconstitutional did not
preclude later decisions holding that it is sometimes impermissibly cruel, so is it
equally clear that a decision upholding a general statutory prohibition of assisted sui-
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opinions while writing a separate concurrence, suggested that she might be
willing to create a new constitutional right in this area, but only if govern-
ments began interfering with physicians' efforts to ameliorate their pa-
tients' pain." Leaving aside O'Connor's puzzling omission of any refer-
ence to cases where individuals find life itself intolerably painful,'2 the
only significant legal threat to normal forms of pain relief arises from ag-
gressive enforcement of the anti-narcotics statutes and parallel regulatory
supervision by state medical boards. O'Connor, however, gave no hint that
she was interested in slowing down the war on drugs.
As the Supreme Court's personnel changes, Glucksberg and Quill
might be read narrowly, or even overruled. More significantly, however,
no one on the Court suggested that the states would be required to maintain
their laws against assisted suicide. On the contrary, as the Glucksberg
majority emphasized in its closing paragraph: "Throughout the Nation,
Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the mo-
rality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding
permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society.'
3
Thus, the future of assisted suicide almost surely lies for now in the hands
of the state and federal legislatures. The immediate prospects here seem
strongly to favor the status quo. Several states have recently strengthened
their laws against assisted suicide or rejected efforts to weaken them,14 and
Congress has forbidden federal funds from being used for assisted sui-
cide.15 Only Oregon, which.legalized assisted suicide by a narrow referen-
cide does not mean that every possible application of the statute would be valid....
[Tihere are situations in which an interest in hastening death is legitimate. Indeed, not
only is that interest sometimes legitimate, I am also convinced that there are times when
it is entitled to constitutional protection.
Justice Souter also concurred only in the judgments, essentially on the ground that legislatures are
better able than courts to make initial decisions about what Souter considered the "emerging"
issue of assisted suicide. See, e.g., id. at 2293:
The experimentation that should be out of the question in constitutional adjudication
displacing legislative judgments is entirely proper, as well as highly desirable, when the
legislative power addresses an emerging issue like assisted suicide. The Court should
accordingly stay its hand to allow reasonable legislative consideration. While I do not
decide for all time that respondents' [substantive due process] claim should not be rec-
ognized, I acknowledge the legislative institutional competence as the better one to deal
with that claim at this time.
11. Seeid.at2303.
12. Even more puzzling is Justice Breyer's declaration that a successful challenge to laws
against assisted suicide would have to involve a patient's effort to avoid "severe physical pain
(connected with death):' Id. at 2311. Breyer did not explain why the avoidance of physical pain
may be entitled to constitutional protection, but only when "connected with death." Nor did he
explain why there should be constitutional distinction between physical pain and psychic pain.
13. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at2275.
14. See, e.g., i. at 2266 (reviewing recent legislative developments).
15. See Pub. L. No. 105-12, 111 Stat. 23 (codified at42 U.S.C. § 14401 etseq.).
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dum vote in 1994, has persisted on a contrary course.16 Below the surface,
however, powerful forces are pushing our society toward an acceptance of
assisted suicide, as well as much harsher forms of hastened dying. Under-
standing and dealing with those forces will require more effort than the
Supreme Court was required to exert when it restrained itself from consti-
tutionalizing the whole field.
This Article will present two distinct but related arguments. Part I ar-
gues that legalizing assisted suicide, whether through judicial or legislative
action, would be a mistake because the harms produced by such a step
would likely outweigh the benefits. Part II suggests that the most impor-
tant goals of the laws against assisted suicide may be threatened far more
profoundly by seemingly unrelated developments in the practice and fi-
nancing of medical care. This Article concludes by suggesting that serious
attention should be given to reforms that would reestablish a more direct
economic relationship between patients and physicians.
L Agency Costs and Assisted Suicide
Why should the law prevent physicians from helping their patients to
commit suicide? It is not self-evident that such prohibitions are consistent
with the individualistic presuppositions in which our polity and legal sys-
tem are rooted. If we begin with the premise that our lives and our bodies
are our own property, a strong justification should be required before we
accept prohibitions against suicide. Such a prohibition, after all, would
seem to smack either of an illegitimate government effort to enforce God's
claim on our lives or of alien socialistic notions under which people's lives
belong first to the state and only derivatively to themselves. 17 It may there-
fore be unsurprising that efforts to create sanctions against suicide are only
a distant memory in most American jurisdictions. 8 But if suicide is
treated almost unquestioningly as the prerogative of free citizens, how can
16. In November, 1997, Oregon voters rejected by a substantial margin a referendum initia-
tive that would have repealed the 1994 law. See William Claiborne and Thomas B. Edsall, Af-
firmation of Oregon Suicide Law May Spur Movement, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1997, at A19.
17. This does not necessarily imply that laws punishing suicide (by asset forfeitures, for ex-
ample) could not be justified on secular grounds that are compatible with the principles of the
American polity. For purposes of this article, however, I will assume for the sake of argument
the libertarian view that a right to suicide is an aspect of personal autonomy that the law should
not deny to competent adults.
18. For a review of the evolution of laws relating to suicide, see Thomas L Marzen, Mary K.
O'Dowd, Daniel Crone, and Thomas . Balch, Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DUQ. L. REV.
1, 63-100 (1985). The authors emphasize that there is little reason to believe that the relaxation
of laws imposing penalties for suicide and attempted suicide has been driven by the theory that
citizens have a right to suicide based on personal autonomy. See id
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one justify interfering with the right to procure assistance in carrying out
this permitted act? Part I of this Article will suggest an answer to that
question. At least in the case of assistance by physicians (and other health
care workers under their control), there are powerful consequentialist ar-
guments for banning assisted suicide, arguments that do not require a
challenge to the libertarian premises of our modem legal tradition.
A. The Hippocratic Bargain
Begin by assuming an unregulated market in medical services. In
such a market, the providers of health care would have to invest in acquir-
ing a medical education, and would then have to market their services to
prospective patients. Because knowledge is power, and because medical
services give their practitioners exceptionally dangerous opportunities to
harm those to whom they sell these services, physicians would want a
mechanism for assuring prospective patients that they will act as faithful
agents for the patient's interests. Without such a mechanism, patients
would have incentives to avoid treatment or use home remedies in some
circumstances in which a doctor could have provided better care at a price
the patient would have been willing to pay. Suppose, for example, that a
woman suffering lower back pain would be willing to pay as much as $100
for an educated diagnosis, but if the price is higher she would decide to
wait and see whether the condition cleared up by itself. If a doctor can
cover the costs of providing such a diagnosis for less than $100, a bargain
should be reached. If, however, the patient believes there is a 50 percent
chance that the doctor will dishonestly prescribe unnecessary and expen-
sive surgery, she may not seek the diagnosis even at a price well below
$100. Or suppose that a man has symptoms consistent with venereal dis-
ease, and he believes that a home remedy costing $50 would give him a 40
percent chance of a cure, whereas a doctor's treatment costing $50 would
give him a 95 percent chance of a cure. Clearly, he would prefer to be
treated by the doctor. If, however, he believes there is a 25 percent chance
that the physician will disclose to his friends and neighbors that he has
contracted a venereal disease, he may choose to rely on the home remedy
instead.
Obviously, patients seldom make such numerical calculations explic-
itly. They do, however, frequently make choices about whether to seek
medical care that are informed by the risks entailed in putting their trust in
doctors. Who has not been warned that physicians are often too quick to
recommend profitable but dangerous surgeries? And who has not had to
remind himself that doctors are supposed to keep embarrassing information
about their patients to themselves? Both physicians and patients would be
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better off if patients could place a high degree of trust in their doctors be-
cause the absence of such trust will prevent many mutually beneficial bar-
gains from being reached. The same could be said of many other comner-
cial relationships, but medicine is a field in which the problem of agency
costs seems especially acute.19 In this case, there is typically a large gap
between the expertise of the seller and buyer of the service,2 and the
stakes for the buyer are often extremely high; this makes it very costly for
the buyer to monitor the seller's honesty and faithfulness.
Thousands of years ago, physicians addressed this problem by devel-
oping and popularizing the Hippocratic Oath, through which they profes-
sionalized their business. The Oath offers the following bargain to pro-
spective patients: "In return for your placing more trust in us than you do
in ordinary tradesmen, we promise to behave in a less self-interested man-
ner than other tradesmen." There are advantages here for both parties.
Physicians get more business because sick people will be less inclined to
practice home remedies, and patients get better medical care when they are
treated by experts. The Oath, and more important the ethical.patterns of
behavior it represents,2 were a success, as Hippocratic medicine survived
in a competitive market and eventually became dominant.22 Because the
19. Stated generally, agency costs may be defined as the sum of a) the resources used by the
principal to control the behavior of the agent; b) the resources used by the agent to assure the
principal that he will forego certain actions harmful to the principal; and c) the cost of any resid-
ual divergence between the agent's actual decisions and the decisions that would have maximized
the principal's welfare. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meekling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
As I will show below, the Hippocratic Oath reduces agency costs in the physician-patient rela-
tionship by investing a relatively small amount of resources in category b), thereby preventing the
need for larger investments in category a) and, in many cases, reducing the costs in category c).
20. Because of this gap, "(e]conomists normally use the monopolistically competitive model
to describe and to analyze market behavior in health care, especially for physician services."
H.E. FRECH aI, COMPETITION & MONOPOLY IN MEDICAL CARE 6 (1996).
21. In this Article, I use the term "ethics" and its cognates to refer to norms of behavior ap-
propriate to a certain occupational group, whether or not such behavior is appropriate elsewhere.
The United States Marine Corps, for example, cultivates ethical norms appropriate to the organi-
zation's peculiar mission. See, e.g., THOMAS E. RICKS, MAKING THE CORPS (1997). Some ethi-
cal standards that are completely appropriate for people in that organization might be out-of-
place in other contexts. Similarly, some ethical standards that are appropriate and quite impor-
tant among physicians might be unneeded, or even harmful, elsewhere.
22. For a concise account of the survival of Hippocratic medicine during antiquity, and its
eventual success in displacing other ethical approaches, see Ludwig Edelstein, The Hippocratic
Oath. Text, Translation and Interpretation, in ANcIENT MEDICINE: SELECTD PAPERS OF
LUDWIG EDESTEIN 62-63 (Oswei Temkin & C. Lillian Temkin, eds., 1967). Edelstein argues
that the Oath was the product of Pythagorean philosophy, and that its eventual widespread adop-
tion was the result of its compatibility with Christianity and other monotheistic religions. How-
ever that may be, the fact remains that it survived and succeeded for many centuries in a variety
of cultural contexts without being dictated by government regulations.
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market ratified the Oath for a very long time before governments began
regulating medical practice 2 it is entitled at the very least to respectful
consideration by anyone interested in identifying the norms and rules that
should control the conduct of medical practice.
The Hippocratic Oath reads as follows:
I swear by Apollo Physician and Asclepius and Hygieia and Panaceia
and all the gods and goddesses, making them my witnesses, that I will
fulfill according to my ability and judgment this oath and this covenant:
To hold the one who has taught me this art as equal to my parents and to
live my life in partnership with him, and if he is in need of money to give
him a share of mine, and to regard his offspring as equal to my brothers
in male lineage and to teach them this art-if they desire to learn it-
without fee and covenant; to give a share of precepts and oral instruction
and all the other learning to my sons and to the sons of him who has in-
structed me and to pupils who have signed the covenant and have taken
an oath according to the medical law, but to no one else.
I will apply dietetic measures for the benefit of the sick according to my
ability and judgment; I will keep them from harm and injustice.
I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I
make a suggestion to this effect. Similarly I will not give to a woman an
abortive remedy. In purity and holiness I will guard my life and my art.
I will not use the knife, not even on sufferers from stone, but will with-
draw in favor of such men as are engaged in this work.
Into whatever houses I may enter, I will come for the benefit of the sick,
remaining clear of all voluntary injustice and of other mischief and of
sexual deeds upon bodies of females and males, be they free or slave.
Things I may see or hear in the course of the treatment or even outside of
treatment regarding the life of human beings, things which one should
never divulge outside, I will keep to myself holding such things unutter-
able [or "shameful to be spoken"].
If I fulfill this oath and do not violate it, may it be granted to me to en-
joy life and art, being honored with fame among all men for all time to
come; if I transgress it and swear falsely, may the opposite of all this be
my lot?
4
23. See, e.g., RODERICK E. McGREW, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICAL HISTORY 179 (1985)
("As in classical antiquity, popular medicine [during the Middle Ages] was a practical affair car-
ried on according to market principles and with no effective regulatory oversight. Advances in
medical education, licensing procedures, and regulatory agencies did not eliminate this sort of
practice until the twentieth century."); id. at 179-82 (discussing spotty development of state
regulation in Europe during the modem period and the absence of regulation in the United States
through the mid-nineteenth century).
24. Translation taken from LEON R. KASS, TowARD A MORE NATURAL SCIENMCE: BIOLOGY
AND HUMAN AFFAIRS 228-29 (1985) (emphasis added).
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Within the Oath, the proscription against assisted suicide is the first of
the negative promises involving professional self-restraint, and it is a
somewhat puzzling one because it is a promise not to give patients what
they want.25 In that respect, assisted suicide is like abortion, with which it
is linked in the Oath. It is much easier for us to see why patients will bene-
fit from the subsequent negative promises in the Oath than it is to see why
they would benefit from having their requests for assisted suicide and
abortion denied.
The answer to this puzzle, I believe, is that patients benefit when phy-
sicians specialize to the greatest extent possible in pursuing a single goal:
health. Not profit maximization. Not market share. And not "giving the
customer what he wants." The Hippocratic physician promises to the
world, and thus to every prospective patient (even legally powerless indi-
viduals like slaves), that he will both refrain from making sexual advances
to patients and that he will resist sexual advances from his patients. He
also promises more generally to come only for the benefit of the sick, and
thus to refrain from euthanasia, even if euthanasia is demanded by the one
who is paying the doctor (such as the parents of a minor or the child of an
elderly person). Similarly, the Hippocratic physician promises not to help
patients kill themselves or their unborn children, even when the patient
wants such actions taken, because this is not consistent with the pursuit of
health.
This self-imposed professional forbearance, which was not required
by the Greek laws or customs of the time,26 is rooted in a coherent and de-
fensible understanding of the nature of medicine? First, it recognizes the
dangerous neutrality of medical technique, which can be used either to
cure or to kill. Only if the means used serve a professionally appropriate
end will medical practice be ethical. Accordingly, the Oath rules out as-
sisting in suicide because the end that medicine pursues-the health of the
living human body-would be contradicted should the physician engage in
delivering death. Most importantly, the taboos against euthanasia and as-
sisted-suicide-like the taboos against violating patient confidentiality and
against sexual relations with patients-address a prominent "occupational
25. A complete economic analysis of the Hippocratic Oath is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle, which will focus on those elements of the Oath most directly relevant to the issues raised by
physician-assisted suicide.26. See EDELSmIN, supra note 22 at 13 ('Suicide was not censured in antiquity. Abortion
was practiced in Greek times no less than in the Roman era, and it was resorted to without scru-
ple." (footnote omitted)).
27. For a detailed discussion of the Oath's rational coherence, see KASS, supra note 24, at
224-46.
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hazard" to which the medical professional is especially prone: a temptation
to take advantage of the vulnerability and exposure of patients. Just as pa-
tients necessarily divulge and reveal to the physician private and intimate
details of their personal lives, and just as patients necessarily expose their
naked bodies to the physician's objectifying gaze and investigating hands,
so patients necessarily expose and entrust the care of their very lives to the
physician's skill, technique, judgment, and character. Conscious of the
meaning of such exposure and vulnerability, and of his own human pen-
chant for error and mischief, the Hippocratic physician voluntarily sets
limits on his own conduct, pledging not to take advantage of or to violate
the patient's intimacies, naked sexuality, or life itself.
The Hippocratic physicians' refusal to assist in suicide was not part of
an aggressive so-called "vitalist" approach to dying patients or an unwill-
ingness to accept mortality. On the contrary, understanding both human
finitude and the limits of the medical art, they refused to intervene when
the patient was deemed incurable, and they regarded it as inappropriate to
prolong the process of dying when death was unavoidable.2 Insisting on
the importance of distinguishing between letting patients die (not only
permissible but laudatory in some circumstances) and actively causing
death (impermissible), they protected themselves and their patients from
their own possible weaknesses and folly, thereby preserving the ethical in-
tegrity of their profession.
The Oath and its ethical vision of medicine is the product of classical
Greek antiquity, and the ban on physician-assisted suicide was not and is
not the result of religious impulses alone. The Oath is fundamentally pa-
gan and medical; and it is not the product of biblical religion or Judeo-
Christian doctrines of the sanctity of human life. Nor is the Oath merely a
parochial product of ancient Greek culture. Notwithstanding the fact that
the Oath begins by invoking Apollo and other deities no longer worshiped,
it reflects and articulates a coherent, rational vision of the art of medicine.
That is why it has been so widely received in the west as a document for
all times and places. The Oath's survival through the centuries is a sign of
the usefulness of its contents, and the fact that it survived for so long with-
out government support reflects its consistency with the mutual interests of
doctors and patients.
28. See Darrel W. Amundsen, The Physician's Obligation to Prolong Life: A Medical Duty
Without ClassicalRoots, 8(4) HASuNGs CENTER REP. 23-30 (1978).
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B. Is the Hippocratic Approach Still Viable?
I will argue below that technological advances in medicine have not
rendered the Hippocratic Oath untenable. A different kind of objection to
my defense of the Hippocratic position on assisted suicide, however, is that
our law no longer supports the Oath's companion proscription against
abortion. More generally, doctors have gotten involved in a variety of
other activities, such as cosmetic surgery and birth control, that bespeak a
profound alteration of the notion that physicians should be specialists de-
voted to a goal-namely, health-set by nature itself. Perhaps we have
simply abandoned the ideal of medicine as a profession and converted it to
yet another trade in which technical expertise is purchased for ends chosen
entirely by the customer.
Although we do seem to be headed in this direction, there are good
reasons for trying to hold the line at assisted suicide. Our experience with
abortion since Roe v. Wade 9 does not undermine this conclusion, but rein-
forces it. Whatever one thinks about the merits of the constitutional analy-
sis in that case, it is hard to avoid noticing that many of the early warnings
about the bad effects of Roe have proven far more accurate than advocates
of legalized abortion predicted at the time. Vast numbers of abortions are
now being performed on a routine basis, often for trivial reasons or as part
of an informal but still morally dubious eugenics movement. 30 The legali-
zation of abortion has also had a coarsening effect on the medical profes-
sion, which now includes in its ranks the people who invented and carry
out the grisly form of infanticide known as "partial birth abortion."31 The
29. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
30. See, e.g., Ivonne Prieto, International Child Health and Women's Reproductive Rights,
14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L& COMP. L. 143, 156 (1993) (two groups most commonly using abortion
are young unmarried women seeking to delay their first childbirth and married women over thirty-
five who want to space additional children or end childbearing); Dena S. Davis, Genetic Dilem-
mias and the Child's Right to an Open Future, 28 RuTGERS LJ. 549,561 (1997) ("a significant
percentage of genetic counselors (a majority of American counselors, in one stdy) have sup-
ported clients' right to use the techniques of amniocentesis and abortion to choose the sex of their
children!'); John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L. REV.
421, 429-30 (1996) ("Many women over thirty-five have amniocentesis or chorion villus sam-
pling for Down's Syndrome. It is estimated that doctors now screen over 60% of American preg-
nancies for neural tube defects." (footnotes omitted)); Lori B. Andrews, Prenatal Screening and
the Culture of Motherhood, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 967, 989-91 (1996) (describing pressures and
subterfuges used by physicians to induce pregnant women to undergo genetic screening and
abortion).
31. See, e.g., Joint Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary of the United States Senate
and the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the United States
House of Representatives on S. 6 and H.R. 929 (The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act), March 11,
1997.
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increasing enthusiasm for assisted suicide within the medical profession
may well be largely a result of the initial major breach of the Hippocratic
rules that legalized abortion brought about.
But why not continue on this path, which its proponents might simply
characterize as the road to customer satisfaction? Many people have an
entirely understandable fear of an overly medicalized death, in which ob-
sessive and callous doctors mindlessly prolong the dying process with ma-
chines and tubes and "heroic" measures that result in nothing but pointless
suffering and indignities. If the customer wants to put a stop to all that by
demanding a poison pill, why should the law or medical ethics say no?
The answer can be summed up in one word: euthanasia3 2 Before ex-
plaining that answer at greater length, however, it is worth pausing to em-
phasize that the law and medical ethics already give patients the clear right
to refuse unwanted medical treatments and to discontinue unwanted medi-
cal interventions, even when death is the probable outcome.s That right
can be exercised, through living wills, advance directives, and durable
powers of attorney, even by those who become incompetent in the final
stages of a fatal disease? A right to physician-assisted suicide is often
confused with a right to terminate unwanted medical treatments, but it is
fundamentally different.35 In the one case, physicians are required to do
what the ethical practice of medicine has always required anyway: letting
32. I use the term "euthanasia" in a broad sense, which includes the deliberate killing of pa-
tients in the course of medical care, for whatever reason and through whatever means. The term
does not, however, include attempts to heal or reduce suffering, even when those efforts carry
with them a high risk of death for the patient. Thus, for example, performing a dangerous surgery
that had a small chance of curing the patient would not be euthanasia; nor would giving danger-
ously high doses of morphine to relieve the pain of patients with advanced cancer, unless the phy-
sician intended thereby to kill the patient
33. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269-70 (1990) (noting
that informed consent is generally required before medical treatment can be administered and that
the right to refuse unwanted treatment is the logical corollary of the doctrine of informed con-
sent).
34. See, e.g., ,VESLEY J. SMITH, FORCED EXm: THE SLIPPERY SLOPE FROM ASSISTED
SUICIDE TO LEGALIZED MURDER 24042 (1997). Proponents of physician-assisted suicide are
inclined to emphasize that physicians frequently ignore patient directives to withhold heroic
measures. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO
HEALTH CARE? 71 (1997). Assuming that advance directives such as "do not resuscitate" orders
are in fact frequently ignored, the most obviously plausible inference is that physicians have a
strong tendency to do what the physician thinks is best, even if the patient thinks otherwise. That
in itself would seem to be a powerful reason to continue the age-old practice of inculcating physi-
cians with a strong ethical aversion to participating in the deliberate killing of their patients.
35. Professor Epstein rightly argues that a logical distinction between withholding needed
medical treatment and providing lethal poisons is an insufficient basis for treating these practices
differently. See EPSTEIN, supra note 34, at 290-93. My argument, which is strictly consequen-
tialist, does not depend on a logical distinction between acts and omissions.
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nature take its course when the patient refuses to be treated or when medi-
cine can no longer do any good. In assisted suicide, by contrast, physi-
cians participate in the deliberate killing of their patients. As the following
discussion will show, once physicians begin treating these practices as in-
terchangeable, the Hippocratic bargain will be at an end, and patients will
have to begin taking costly new precautions against their doctors. Physi-
cians and patients will both be worse off, but the bigger losers will be the
patients.
1. Assisted Suicide and the Physician-Patient Relationship
Once death becomes a "therapeutic option" that physicians can
choose, we shall almost certainly see a great increase in suicide and physi-
cian-assisted death, far beyond the few and limited kinds of cases now in-
voked to justify a change in the law. Incentives will be altered, not only
for patients given new means to time their deaths, but also for physicians,
families, hospitals, health maintenance organizations, and insurers. It is
especially important to focus on these incentives, which operate almost in-
visibly and are therefore easy to forget, whenever we are confronted with
extreme cases that are brought forth to gain sympathy for overturning the
prohibition against assisted suicide. As we shall see, the few patients
caught up in genuinely heart-rending medical situations are very hard to
separate, both logically and practically, from countless other potential
"candidates" for assisted death.
Many families and physicians will find that the option of electable
death presents an opportunity to relieve themselves of the emotional bur-
dens of caring for difficult or incurable patients. Others will be able to
avoid huge economic costs or to achieve financial gain connected to an
earlier demise, especially where an inheritance will be jeopardized by the
expense of caring for long-lingering illness. Although relatives and physi-
cians may not be consciously aware that they are succumbing to such
temptations, they will subtly but surely be pulled in that direction.
Proponents of assisted suicide may object that only the patient will be
legally entitled to initiate the request for lethal poisons. They can also
point out that concern for the economic well-being of one's survivors is not
a contemptible reason for electing an earlier death. But such arguments,
though appealing in theory, naively idealize the usual situation of patients
who are severely ill. The assumption of rational autonomy, which has con-
siderable value in many legal contexts, deserves to be treated with special
caution when applied to medical practice. Illness nearly invariably means
dependence, and dependence means relying for advice on physician and
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family. This is especially true with the seriously or terminally ill, where
there is frequently also depression or diminished mental capacity that
clouds one's judgment or weakens one's resolve. With patients thus re-
duced-helpless in action and ambivalent about life-someone who will
benefit from their death need not proceed by overt coercion. Rather, re-
quests for assisted suicide can and will be subtly engineered. To alter and
influence choices, moreover, physicians and families need not be driven
entirely by base motives. Indeed, they need not even be consciously ma-
nipulative. Well-meaning and discreet suggestions, or even unconscious
changes in expression, gesture, and tone of voice, can move a dependent
and suggestible patient toward a choice for death.3 6 Simply by making as-
sisted suicide an option available to gravely ill persons, will we not "sweep
up, in the process, some who are not really tired of life, but think others are
tired of them; some who do not really want to die, but who feel they should
not live on, because to do so when there looms the legal alternative of
euthanasia is to do a selfish or cowardly act?"37 It does not require much
imagination or experience with the elderly and the incurable to recognize
that many of them will experience-and be helped to experience-their
* right to choose physician-assisted death as a duty to do so.
Idealized assumptions of doctor-patient equality and of patient auton-
omy in medical decision-making can be useful in some contexts, but they
do not accurately reflect the reality of most of our encounters with physi-
cians. This-is so even in the best of circumstances, when the patient is in
relatively good health and where there is an intimate doctor-patient rela-
tionship of long standing. But with the seriously ill, the hospitalized, and,
especially with the vast majority of patients who are treated by physicians
who know them little or not at all, many choices for death by the so-called
autonomous patient will not be truly free and fully informed. Physicians
have far less costly access to the necessary information regarding progno-
sis, alternative treatments, and their costs and burdens. Like many techni-
cal experts, they are masters at framing the options to guarantee a particu-
lar outcome.38 This they almost always do already in presenting
therapeutic options to the "autonomous patient" for his decision, and there
36. "The most successful form of manipulation is to lead a person to think that someone
else's idea is actually his or her own, or to nudge that person's already existing ambivalence one
way or the other." Daniel Callahan & Margot White, The Legalization of Physician Assisted
Suicide: Creating a Regulatory Potemkin Village, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 1, 7 (1996).
37. Yale Kamisar, Some Non-religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy Killing" Legisla-
tion, 42 MINN. L. REV. 969, 990 (1958).
38. See, e.g., NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LnFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS
SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANAIA IN THE MEDICALCONTEXT 121-22(1994).
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is no reason to think this will change should one of those options become
assistance for death. When the physician presents a depressed or fright-
ened patient with a horrible prognosis and includes among the options the
offer of a "gentle quick release," what will the patient likely choose, espe-
cially in the face of a spiraling hospital bill or resentful children? The le-
galization of physician-assisted suicide, ostensibly a measure enhancing
the freedom of dying patients, will in many cases be a deadly license for
physicians to recommend and prescribe death, free from outside scrutiny
and immune from possible prosecution.
Partly for this reason, the practice of physician-assisted suicide is
likely to erode the trust that patients give to physicians. True, some pa-
tients may be relieved to know that their old family doctor will now be able
to provide suicide-assistance if asked. But many patients-especially
those who cannot rely on a strong social network or who lack a close rela-
tionship with a trusted personal doctor-will have new reasons to be sus-
picious of the strangers on whom they must rely for advice and treatment.
Once doctors have a license to lure their patients into death, patients will
have many occasions to wonder whether they are being led down that road,
and they will surely wonder what the doctor is likely to do if they resist his
wishes. Nor will it be easy to find a satisfactory alternative to relying on
the doctors they encounter. In the very cases where assisted suicide is usu-
ally imagined to be most appropriate-among the dying elderly-it will be
virtually impossible for patients to adopt effective precautions against irre-
sponsible physicians or to substitute self-help therapies for professional
medical care. Some will attempt self-treatment, and others will simply
postpone medical care as long as possible. The result, in many cases, will
be patients inadvertently shortening their own lives and increasing their
own suffering in an effort to avoid having doctors do it for them.
Trust will suffer profoundly in more subtle ways. Should physician-
assisted suicide become a legal option, it will enter unavoidably-some-
times explicitly, sometimes tacitly-into many doctor-patient encounters.
Though there may be some regulatory attempts to prevent physicians from
introducing the subject, once it exists as a patient's legal right there will be
even stronger pressures to make sure that the patient knows he has the op-
tion.39 Ineluctably, patients will now be forced to wonder about their doc-
39. Analogous pressures now operate in the matter of abortion: even obstetricians opposed
to abortion are often compelled to discuss it, if only to avoid later lawsuits should the child be
born with abnormalities. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Silent No More: Physicians' Legal and Ethi-
cal Obligations to Patients Seeking Abortions, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 279, 292
(1.994-95) ("Wrongful birth claims arise when a physician who provides prenatal care fails to
disclose information that suggests that the woman could give birth to a child with serious dis-
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tor, regardless of how he handles the situation. Did he introduce the sub-
ject because he secretly or unconsciously wishes to abandon me, or worse,
because he wishes I were dead? Does he avoid the subject for the same
reason, fearing to let me suspect the truth, or conversely, is it because he
wants me to suffer? Few patients will openly express such fears and
doubts. Because they must rely on their doctor, they do not want to risk
alienating him by seeming to distrust his motives and good will. Anyone
who has experienced the subtle psychodynamics of the doctor-patient rela-
tionship should see immediately the corrosive effects of doubt and suspi-
cion that will be caused by explicit (or avoided) speech about physician-
assisted death.
Trust is not just a moral nicety. It is a valuable device for reducing
agency costs by diminishing the need for patients to take costly steps to
monitor the faithfulness of their doctors. These steps will often be ex-
tremely, and even prohibitively, costly because of the informational asym-
metries between doctors and patients. A patient's trust in the physician,
moreover, is frequently an important element in the therapeutic relation-
ship and, at least indirectly, in the healing process itself. One does not
happily follow advice from people one does not trust. Mistrust produces
stress, anger, and resistance to treatment. In the increasingly impersonal
world of modem medicine, patients must without any direct evidence pre-
sume that their care-givers are trustworthy, even before they have shown
that they deserve to be trusted. Especially under these conditions, the trust
given to each physician stems largely from the trustworthiness attached to
the profession as a whole. Thus, with the taboo against physician-assisted
suicide broken, legitimate fears of deadly abuse of the new license to pre-
scribe death will attach even to physicians who seek to adhere to tradi-
tional ethical norms. Their ability to heal and comfort their patients will
therefore often be compromised!'
abilities. The woman's claim is that if she had been informed of the risk, she would have sought
an abortion. Most courts have upheld a patient's wrongful birth claims." (footnote omitted)); see
also Belinda L. Kimble, Wrongful Birth: a Practitioner's Guide to a New Arrival, 55 ALA. LAW.
84, 85 (1994) ("Almost half of the states' highest courts have considered actions for wrongful
birth, and all but two states have recognized such actions.'); Julie Gantz, State Statutory Preclu-
sion of Wrongful Birth Relief. A Troubling Rewriting of a Woman's Right to Choose and the
Doctor-Patient Relationship, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 795, 817-18 & nn.103-04 (1997) (noting
that many states recognize actions for wrongful birth); see also Melinda A. Roberts, Distin-
guishing Wrongful from "Righdiul" Life, 6 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 59, 60 (1990)
("wrongful birth action is well-established in present-day law") (footnote omitted).
40. For the reasons given here, it is a mistake to assume that trust in the physician-patient
relationship is always fostered by physician complaisance. The general point should also be ap-
parent to anyone who has had to rely on a "yes-man" subordinate. Professor Epstein has there-
fore not presented a convincing argument when he poses the following rhetorical question: "Is a
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2. The Road to Euthanasia
Even if one supposes that these costs of physician-assisted suicide
would be outweighed by its benefits, the practice is virtually certain to ex-
pand well beyond the narrow range now envisioned. From assisting the
suicide of fully competent patients on the verge of death, it is a very short
step to "assisting" the non-terminally-ill and the less-than-fully-competent,
and to engaging in euthanasia, both with and without the patient's consent.
None of the boundaries among these closely related practices is likely to be
defensible in practice.41
The underlying difficulty arises from the blending of principles that
generates the appeal of allowing assisted suicide in certain cases. When
someone who seems fully competent asks for help in terminating a life that
seems to us obviously not worth living, it seems hard-hearted to say that
tie request should be denied.42 But if this is actually justified by the prin-
ciple of autonomy and choice, then the whole matter is too personal, inti-
mate, and subjective to be governed by any objective criteria, such as certi-
fiable terminal illness or truly intractable pain.43 For who is to say what
relationship of trust advanced or thwarted if a patient cannot be sure that her physician will honor
her requests on matters of greatest moment to her?" See EPSTEIN, supra note 34, at 307. Profes-
sor Epstein's rhetorical question is also inapt because few, if any, physicians will automatically
honor all their patients' requests for assisted suicide. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
41. The step from assisted suicide to euthanasia is so short that it is virtually inevitable.
What if the patient's infirmity prevents him from putting the pills into his mouth or from swal-
lowing them? What if he vomits them up or if, for some other reason, the usually "lethal dose"
does not produce death in his case? The physician will surely not stand idly by: he is now com-
mitted to the patient's death, and he will certainly lend a hand.
42. There are no doubt some cases in which the appeal of helping a resolute patient who is
suffering terribly to kill himself must be extremely strong. It is probably also safe to assume that
many physicians throughout history have violated the Hippocratic Oath by providing assistance in
such cases. While we all know that virtually every general rule produces bad results in some
cases, we should recognize that this does not mean that all general rules are pernicious. One vir-
tue of a robust Hippocratic tradition is that it inculcates in most physicians a deep aversion to
promoting the deaths of their patients, and thereby discourages them from doing so in doubtful
cases or for inappropriate reasons. Within the Hippocratic tradition, it may be and probably has
be.n the better part of wisdom to avoid exercising the utmost vigilance in flushing out into the
light every deviation from the strict Hippocratic rule. This kind of hypocrisy, which sensible and
civilized people practice in many areas of social life, has many advantages over the alternative
usually proposed: bringing it out of the shadows and letting the lawyers make up some regula-
tions to "control" it. I will suggest briefly in subsection (3) below why the regulatory impulse is
particularly misguided in this context.
43. Terminal illness is notoriously difficult to define precisely and almost as difficult to pre-
dict accurately. For example, the frequently used estimate of "less than six months to live" leaves
unanswered whether it means six months with or without speilfic forms of treatment. Besides, a
new legal right to determine the time and manner of one's death would, if limited to the termi-
nally ill, seem to discriminate unfairly against those who are fated to suffer their illnesses for
longer periods of time. Patients wiih early Alzheimer's disease or Lou Gehrig's disease or multi-
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makes suffering or life "unbearable" or death "electable" for another per-
son? The autonomy argument on which the case for assisted suicide is
supposed to rest will sooner or later undermine all criteria proposed for
evaluating the patient's choice. If the justification, however, is the worth-
lessness of the life in question, then there is no reason to confine the bene-
fits of hastened death to those who are competent and who request it.
In practice, the governing principle is likely to become the physician's
judgment about the worthiness of particular lives. Almost no physician is
going to accede to a patient's request for deadly drugs unless the physician
believes that there are good reasons to justify the patient's choice for
death: too much pain, loss of dignity, lack of self-command, poor quality
of life. Only if the physician accepts the patient's verdict that "life is no
longer worth living" will he comply with the request. Unless one supposes
that physicians will routinely give lethal poisons to lovesick college stu-
dents or those temporarily deranged by recreational drugs, it is obvious
that doctors will often try to persuade patients to accept some other course
of treatment or palliation, including psychotherapy for suicidal wishes."
Physician-assisted suicide in practice will be performed by physicians not
out of simple deference to patient choice but for reasons of mercy: this is a
"useless" or "degrading" or "dehumanized" life that pleads for active mer-
ciful termination, and therefore deserves my medical assistance.
Once physicians begin assisting suicide for reasons of "mercy," it will
become very tempting to begin delivering the dehumanized, whether the
dehumanized choose it or not. Only if we supposed that most of the dehu-
manized were also fully competent would it make sense to believe that
pie sclerosis, for example, are not considered terminally ill, yet they are obvious candidates for
assistance in dying. Indeed, Jack Kevorkian's career began with such cases. See generally
MIcHAELBETzoLD, APPOImENT WITH DOCTOR DEATH (1993).
44. In the Netherlands, where assisted suicide and euthanasia have been effectively legalized
for some two decades, some two-thirds of patient requests for such "treatment" are rejected. See
P.J. van der Maas, et. al., Euthanasia and other Medical Decisions Concerning the End of Life:
An Investigation Performed upon Request of the Commission of Inquiry into the Medical Prac-
tice Concerning Euthanasia, 2212 HEALTH PoLiCY (Special Issue) 193-94 (1992) (hereinafter
cited as "van der Maas Report'). Similarly, one survey of American physicians indicated that
about three-quarters of requests for assisted suicide and and two-thirds of requests for euthanasia
were rejected (and that only a small number of these rejections were based on fear of the legal
consequences). Anton L. Back, et al., Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in Washington
State: Patient Requests and Physician Responses, 275 JAMA 919, 922 (March 27, 1996).
Such data do not imply that all physicians will be highly discriminating. Oddly enough,
even the most intellectually rigorous proponents of patient autonomy, physician-assisted suicide,
and euthanasia do not expressly endorse the delivery of deadly poisons to love-lorn teenagers and
patients suffering from emotional disorders. On their principles, however, it is hard to see what
objection there could be if Jack Kevorkian's epigones went into the business of helping to deliver
such people from life. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 34, at 306 (arguing that the principle of
self-ownership, which authorizes suicide, entails the right to contract to have oneself killed).
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death-dealing by doctors would remain confined to those who freely and
knowingly elect it. But this clearly is not the case. The vast majority of
patients whose lives seem worthless to outside observers cannot make in-
formed requests for assistance with suicide. Persons in a so-called persis-
tent vegetative state; those suffering from severe depression, senility, or
mental illness; infants who are deformed; and retarded or dying children-
all of these are incapable of consenting to death, but they are not likely to
be denied the new humane aid-in-dying. Indeed, after a Canadian man was
given a ten-year prison term for killing his daughter, who suffered from
cerebral palsy, one leader in the assisted-suicide movement characterized
the sentence as "quite unconscionable" because the parents had already
served a twelve-year sentence during the child's life.45
Professor Richard Epstein contends that family members and legal
guardians are generally more trustworthy than "the state" in making the
necessarily difficult decisions about life or death for incompetent pa-
tients,46 but even he acknowledges that the government must put limits on
these decisions:
State intervention must be used to preserve lives known to be worth liv-
ing, but it should be rejected as a tool to preserve lives haunted by pain
or doomed to eerie silence. Imperfect utilitarian judgments as to the
prospects and quality of life are inescapable whenever life and death de-
cisions are made, for ourselves as well as for others. That issue cannot
be glossed over with unthinking categorical rules that ignore evident,
perceived differences in prognosis and expectations. When life is hope-
less or inert, the guardian may not have the duty, but surely has the right,
to see that the life ends; and if active euthanasia is the best means to
achieve that end, so be it.
47
This attack on "unthinking categorical rules" is an arresting remark
because it is offered by the legal academy's leading advocate of imperfect
categorical rules. 8 The categorical rule on which Professor Epstein him-
45. See Clyde H. Farnsworth, Mercy Killing in Canada Stirs Calls for Change in Law, NY
TrAEs, Nov. 22, 1994, at A6.
.46. See Epsmm, supra note 34, at 353. ("Whenever the incompetent has not or could not
have [chosen in advance what medical interventions should be provided or withheld], familial
judgments are preferred to judgments by the state:").
47. Id. at 358.
48. See RIcHARD A. EPSTEN, SIMPLE RULEs FOR A CoMPLEx WORLD (1995) (proposing
that the entire legal system be based on six categorical rules: autonomy, first possession, volun-
tary exchange, protection against aggression, limited privilege for cases of necessity, and takings
of property for public use on payment of just compensation). Professor Epstein acknowledges
that this is not a recipe for Utopia:
I realize that no set of rules will be perfect in its application; indeed, knowing when to
quit is one of the driving forces behind a set of simple rules. Nonetheless even though
there are some daunting exceptions, these rules do have the virtue of offering solutions
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self seems to settle is that non-voluntary euthanasia of incompetent pa-
tients should be confined to those "who are in a permanent vegetative state
or who have slipped into a final coma. '49 Regrettably, this rule appears to
have been advanced on the questionable and unsupported assumption that
physicians can reliably determine when unconsciousness is "permanent"
and when comas are "final."' 5 More profoundly, Professor Epstein's pro-
posal seems to be based entirely on a personal preference derived from
personal intuitions about what makes life worth living. In light of the care-
ful and elaborate reasoning that characterizes most of Professor Epstein's
argument in favor of assisted suicide and euthanasia, it seems highly sig-
nificant that he can do no better than to offer a personal intuition about this
matter. Others will have different intuitions and preferences, especially
when there is the opportunity to avoid large financial or emotional burdens
associated with keeping an unwanted patient alive. The rules worked out
in the Hippocratic tradition are certainly categorical, but they are not "un-
thinking." On the contrary, they have been thought about, and tested in
practice, for a very long time. That gives them a real advantage over one
person's intuitions about worthy and unworthy lives, especially when pow-
erful forces will exert relentless pressure to carry euthanasia far beyond the
seemingly narrow limits that Professor Epstein would personally prefer.51
for 90 to 95% of all possible situations. Never ask for more from a legal system. The
effort to clean up the last 5% of the cases leads to an unraveling of the legal system in-
sofar as it governs the previous 95%. No single, carefully constructed hypothetical
case offers sufficient practical reason to overturn any rule that has stood the test of
time.
Id. at 53. So far as I can tell, Professor Epstein has not brought this insight to bear on the time-
tested rule against physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia.
49. See EPSTEIN, supra note 34, at 357.
50. Professor Epstein asserts:
The permanent vegetative state is so radically discontinuous from other ailments and
maladies, and so irreversible, that it falls into a separate category governed by its own
rules. A rule that said "allow death in a permanent vegetative state" could easily be
adopted without sliding down some slippery slope, so close is the permanent vegetative
state to clinical death.
d. at 349. Professor Epstein provides no evidence to support either of these assertions. For evi-
dence to the contrary, see infra notes 106-109 and accompanying text. Another puzzling aspect
of Professor Epstein's proposed categorical rule is that it seems to be inconsistent with his claim,
in the passage quoted in the text, that state intervention should be rejected to preserve "lives
haunted by pain." Obviously, there are many incompetent patients (for example, children and the
deranged) who endure lives haunted by pain although they are not in a "permanent vegetative
state" or a "final coma."
51. These forces are explored in more detail in Part II below.
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3. The Dutch Experience and the Impossibility of Effective Regulation
The specter of unauthorized euthanasia is not a figment conjured up
by scare-mongers. Recent reports on the practice of euthanasia in Holland
provide ample proof. Although assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia
by physicians are technically still against the law there, the practice has
been tolerated and even encouraged for nearly twenty years, under guide-
lines established by the medical profession. Although the guidelines insist
that choosing death must be informed and voluntary, a 1989 survey of 300
physicians conducted by the supporters of euthanasia disclosed that over
40 percent had performed non-voluntary euthanasia and over 10 percent
had done so five times or more. An elaborate and carefully constructed
§tudy commissioned by the Dutch Government's Commission of Inquiry
into the Medical Practice of Euthanasia provides even more striking data.
Besides an estimated 2,300 cases of voluntary.euthanasia and 400 cases of
physician-assisted suicide per year, there are at least 1,000 cases of active
non-voluntary euthanasia performed without the patient's knowledge or
consent.
53
In some of the non-voluntary euthanasia cases, perhaps as many as 14
percent, the patients are totally competent.54 In addition to these cases,
more than 15 percent of all deaths in the Netherlands result from overdoses
of pain-killing drugs; in some 36 percent of these cases, the overdose is
given at least partly with the purpose of shortening the patient's life, and in
27 percent of the cases, the patient is competent but not consulted about
the decision.5 It is not entirely clear why all of the drug overdose cases
were distinguished from the 1,000 cases classified as non-voluntary eutha-
nasia, but the separate classification does make it clear that an estimate of
1,000 is extremely conservative. The authors estimate that as many as 2
percent of all deaths in the Netherlands may involve drug overdoses that
might reasonably be classified as non-voluntary euthanasia.
5 6
52. See John Keown, Some Reflections on Euthanasia in the Netherlands, in EUTHANASIA,
CLINICALPRACTICE AND TiE LAW 193,209 (Luke Gormally ed., 1994) [hereinafter cited as Ke-
own, Some Reflections] (citing F.C.B. van Wijmen, Artsen en het Zelfgekozen Leven seinde
(Doctors and the Self-Chosen Termination of Life) 24, Table 18 (1989)). Keown does not de-
scribe the methodology used in this survey.
53. See van der Maas Report, supra note 44, at 193-94. Comparable rates of non-voluntary
euthanasia for the United States would be roughly 20,000 cases per year. The methodology of the
study, which included three distinct surveys, is described id, at 9-18.
54. See id. at 61 (Table 6.4). This figure emerged from one of the three constituent surveys
in the van der Maas study, which the authors suggest may be unreliable. See id, at 57-58, 65-69.
55. See id. at 72,73 (Table 7.2), 75 (Table 7.7).
56. See id. at 183.
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Because the usual name for euthanasia performed without the pa-
tient's request is "murder," the exact language of the survey report is worth
quoting: "On an annual basis there are, in the Netherlands, some thousand
cases (0.8% of all deaths) for which physicians prescribe, supply or ad-
minister a drug with the explicit purpose of hastening the end of life with-
out an explicit request of the patient. ''
The authors of the study were at pains to emphasize the "suffering"
that was avoided through these acts, and the fact that large numbers of
doctors volunteered in a government-sponsored survey that they had corn-
mitted murder speaks volumes about the level of tolerance for this prac-
tice.58 And why are Dutch physicians doing this? The reasons given by
physicians for killing patients without their request included: "low quality
of life" (31 percent of the cases); "the relatives could no longer cope" (32
percent); "no chance of improvement" (60 percent); "futility" of medical
therapy (39 percent); and the avoidance of "needless prolongation" (33
percent); pain or suffering was mentioned as a reason in only 30 percent of
the cases.5 9 The burden of proof, one would think, should be on those who
believe that Dutch physicians are for some reason more prone than their
American counterparts to convert a license for assisted suicide into the
practice of institutionalized murder.
Even proponents of physician-assisted suicide concede that there are
dangers of misuse and abuse.? But, they believe, physicians and state
governments can establish guidelines and regulations that will prevent such
57. See id. at 182. This is alow estimate based on one of the three constituent surveys taken
as part of the van der Maas study. One of the other surveys produced an estimate of 1.6%, or
double the estimate adopted by the authors of the report. See id. at 181.
Professor Epstein, who concludes that "the difficulty in the Dutch experience does not lie in
its outcomes, but in the clumsiness of their formal requirements," summarizes the results of the
van der Maas Report without mentioning these findings; oddly, he does provide an elaborate cri-
tique of a much more limited study that was published before these survey results were reported.
See EPSTEIN, supra note 34, at 320-24.
58. See van der Maas Report, supra note 44, at 182. The doctors who acknowledged prac-
ticing non-voluntary euthasia must have assumed that they would not be regarded as murderers,
and their confidence was rewarded. Van der Maas and his co-authors concluded that "[mledical
decision-making and medical acting concerning the end of life are of good quality in The Neth-
erlands." Id. at 199. Similarly, the government commission that sponsored the van der Maas
study concluded that the absence of a request "only serves to make the decision process more dif-
ficult' and rationalized the practice by saying that the "degrading condition the patient is in con-
fronts the doctor with a case of force majeure:' John Keown, Further Reflections on Euthanasia
in the Netherlands in the Light of the Remmelink Report and the Van Der Maas Survey (herein-
after cited as Keown, Further Reflections), in EUTHANASIA, CLINICAL PRACTICE AND THE LAW
219, 229 (Luke Gormally, ed., 1994).
59. Van der Maas Report, supra note 44, at 64 (Table 6.7).
60. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 34, at 313-28.
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abuses and curtail undesirable extensions of the practice.61 This confi-
dence in regulation is a mere assertion. Indeed, it is nothing but a pious
hope, and one that flies in the face of existing evidence and common sense.
The guidelines that have been proposed are, in fact, defective and in-
effective. The evidence from Holland already shows that they are not be-
ing followed: the rather comprehensive regulations that include require-
ments of voluntariness, thoughtfully considered and persistent requests by
the patient, unacceptable suffering, consultation with a second physician,
and accurate reporting of the cause of death are all being ignored in many
cases.62 There are many known cases of non-voluntary euthanasia, and no
reason to doubt that many more go unreported. In the majority of cases,
Dutch physicians illegally certify that death was due to natural causes.
6 3
Moreover, in several court cases where the guidelines were clearly ig-
nored, the Dutch have been willing to set aside the established criteria and
regulations, in the name of mercy and in the name of an alleged medical
duty to relieve suffering that is said to outweigh the duty not to kill.6"
The problem is not peculiar to the Dutch regulations or to Dutch so-
cial prejudices and legal arrangements. As Daniel Callahan and Margot
White have shown, any guidelines and regulations that have been or could
be proposed are likely to be equally defective and ineffective.65 Callahan
and White analyze in considerable detail the Oregon law authorizing as-
sisted suicide, as well as other state legislative proposals and some model
guidelines proposed in the academic literature. They offer compelling ar-
guments for concluding that the usually mentioned safeguards of consent,
mental competence or capacity, voluntariness, limited or restricted eligi-
bility, witnesses, clear definitions of what constitutes abuse, and specific
requirements to report, investigate, and punish abuse are inadequate to the
task.
61. See, e.g., Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 832-33:
State laws or regulations governing physician-assisted suicide are both necessary and
desirable to ensure against errors and abuse, and to protect legitimate state interests.
Any of several model statutes might serve as an example of how these legitimate and
important concerns can be addressed effectively.... [We believe that sufficient pro-
tections can and will be developed by the various states, with the assistance of the
medical profession and health care industry, to insure that the possibility of error will
be remote.
See also Quill, 80 F.3d at 730.
62. See HERBERT HENDIN, SEDUCED BY DEATH: DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND THE DuTcH
CURE (1996); Keown, Some Reflections, supra note 52; Keown, Further Reflections, supra note
58.
63. See Keown, Further Reflections, supra note 58, at 235-36.
64. See Callahan & White, supra note 36, at 15.
65. See Callahan & White, supra note 36.
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The real difficulty does not lie in fashioning the right procedural
rules, but in the impossibility of making any procedural rules effective.
The practice of assisted-suicide is in principle unregulable, insofar as it
will occur in the privacy of the doctor-patient relationship: "[M]aintaining
the privacy of the physician-patient relationship and the confidentiality of
these deliberations is fundamentally incompatible with meaningful over-
sight and adherence to any statutory regulations." 66 Laws and regulations,
moreover, cannot provide anything like a substitute for physicians' judg-
ment about relevant and subtle distinctions among particular patients (with
respect, for example, to decisionmaking capacity) and particular illnesses
(with respect, for example, to whether the disease is "terminal"). As Cal-
lahan and White show in detail, legalization of physician-assisted suicide
will not lead to regulation of the practice, but to deregulation of the physi-
cians, who will now have more power than ever over the life and death of
their patients.67
4. The Future of Hippocratic Medicine
The Hippocratic Oath is a valuable device, which was ratified by the
market over the course of many centuries, at least in part because it re-
duces agency costs in transactions between physicians and patients. To the
extent that physicians as a group credibly commit to obeying the tenets of
the Oath, patients are saved from incurring considerable costs in monitor-
ing their doctors to ensure that the doctor acts in the patient's interest. Pa-
tients are also saved considerable costs that would otherwise result from
physicians failing to act in their patients' interests. The Oath's ban on as-
sisting patients to commit suicide is a crucial element in preserving an ap-
propriate level of trust in the physician-patient relationship, and in pre-
venting doctors from becoming the most dangerous thing that they are
most tempted to be: euthanizers of unwilling victims.
66. Id. at 9. The text continues:
What if a physician decides not to come forward? A patient might want to keep his sui-
cide private. Or the doctor may decide that the regulatory specifications have not been
met, but nonetheless be sympathetic to the patient's request. It is not difficult to imag-
ine many circumstances in which either the physician or the patient, or both, would pre-
fer to keep the agreement secret. How can that situation be monitored or regulated?
How could abuses be detected if a physician wrongly decided to induce someone to
consider, and then use, [physician-assisted suicide]?... Precisely the principle that
allows doctors and patients to reach private agreements-doctor-patient confidential-
ity-no less assures them that [physician-assisted-suicide] decisions can continue to be
effectively hidden. Id.
67. Id. at 64; see also Keown, Further Reflection, supra note 58, at 238-39.
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Although the Hippocratic Oath helped professionalize medicine in a
way that survived a very extended market test, it is no longer the profes-
sion's principal organizing force. In its place, we have substituted legal
regulation. In some respects, the legal rules we have adopted reinforce
Hippocratic principles, as with the laws forbidding assisted suicide. In
other respects, the law is now simply inconsistent with those principles, as
in the case of abortion. In still other respects, the legal regulations are dif-
ferent, but not starkly inconsistent. In place of the Hippocratics' private
efforts to withhold medical training from persons unwilling to subscribe to
the Oath, for example, we now have government rules that dictate who can
be licensed to practice medicine and how those licenses can be revoked.68
To the extent that government licensing agencies adopt and enforce
the principles of the Hippocratic Oath, they strengthen the bonding mecha-
nism that the Oath provided under conditions of free competition. With
Hippocratic principles thus tied to an indispensable government license, a
physician who violates the Oath is risking a very high penalty if he is
caught, and the promises contained in the Oath therefore become highly
credible. 69 If, however, government legalizes practices that the Oath for-
bids, it becomes extremely costly for physicians to commit themselves
credibly to the Hippocratic bargain. An individual doctor could hang up a
sign in his waiting room announcing that he practices Hippocratic medi-
cine and spelling out the tenets of the Oath. 0 But why should the patient
believe the promises? There would be no sanction from the outside on
violators, and it is difficult to imagine how the parties could contract for
meaningful sanctions to be applied. Furthermore, we already know that
obstetricians who do not themselves practice abortion are forced to facili-
tate abortion lest they be subjected to "wrongful birth" suits.71 Physicians
who refused to practice assisted suicide would be forced to violate the
Oath's proscription against "making a suggestion to this effect" for exactly
analogous reasons, and patients would of course come to know this. As
various forms of euthanasia became legally acceptable, they would inevi-
tably fall within the scope of medically appropriate care, and tort law
would almost certainly impose liability for failure to deliver such care.
Hippocratic physicians would thus be forced at the very least to call in
68. See 61 AM. JuR. 2D §§ 51-68 ("Qualifications of Applicants for License').
69. This does not mean that enforcement would or could be perfect. But if physicians had to
risk professional ruin and possibly prison when they bent or broke the rules-for example, by
helping a patient commit suicide-it is unlikely that many would do so casually.
70. Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 34, at 324-25 (noting that Dutch hospitals and nursing homes
commonly advertise whether they practice euthanasia or not).
71. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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other doctors to perform euthanasia, and the Hippocratic bargain would un-
ravel completely.
While medical licensing exists, the law must perforce either
strengthen or completely undermine the Hippocratic bargain. For the rea-
sons set out above, I contend that changing the law in a way that under-
mines the Hippocratic ethic would be a mistake.72  Agency costs in the
doctor-patient relationship would rise, possibly by an enormous amount,
and the offsetting benefits would likely prove trivial or illusory. This does
not imply, however, that a refusal to legalize assisted suicide is adequate
protection against the dangers that such a step would bring. On the con-
trary, government's involvement in the medical marketplace goes far be-
yond the licensing of doctors, and this involvement maj be the greatest ob-
stacle of all to preserving the benefits of the Hippocratic bargain.
72. The laws against assisted suicide apply generally, not just to assistance by physicians,
and it is possible to imagine a world in which we maintained the rule against physician-assisted
suicide, while allowing non-physicians to go into business as suicide assisters. My arguments
against physician-assisted suicide would not apply to such a proposal. So far as I know, how-
ever, proponents of assisted suicide do not advocate this approach and I do not believe it would
have wide appeal.
To see why, it is helpful to distinguish two categories of potential customers. First, there are
people who are not confined to hospitals, but who want to commit suicide. Very little now stands
in their way apart from their own lack of resolve. For those who want a quick death, firearms,
tall buildings, and high bridges are readily available. For those who want a quiet death, one can
simply turn on a car in a closed garage or a gas oven in a closed room (a technique that differs
little from Jack Kevorkian's), and the booming business in carbon monoxide detectors for the
home is good evidence that this is no secret. If non-physician suicide assisters were licensed by
the government to prescribe deadly drugs, it might become slightly more convenient for those
who are noCvery resolute to kill themselves. But it is not obvious that this incremental increase in
consumer convenience would be an unmixed blessing. Many people who attempt suicide later
express gratitude that they failed, and many who succeed undoubtedly would regret it later if they
could. Suicide attempts are often really cries for help in living, and it is hard to see why we
should be eager to make it as easy as possible for such people to evade the natural revulsion
against self-destruction.
The second category of potential customers for suicide assistance are those extremely ill pa-
tients who no longer have the physical strength and mobility to kill themselves without help.
Some of these patients presumably would choose to purchase the services of non-physician sui-
cide assisters. In order to retain a meaningful ban on assistance by physicians, however, physi-
cians should be forbidden to refer patients to suicide specialists. Physicians should be allowed to
use their persuasive powers to discourage their patients from contracting with such people, and
should also be allowed to force would-be suicides to leave the hospital in order to get help in
killing themselves. Although it is conceivable that suicide clinics might spring up under these
conditions, it hardly seems likely that there is really a lot of unsatisfied demand for this sort of
thing.
The absence of a clamor for legalized suicide-assistance outside the medical setting reflects,
I believe, the fact that the real demand is for physician-assisted suicide, both by those whose true
goal is promoting euthanasia and by those who mistakenly believe that assisted-suicide is a sensi-
ble alternative to degrading and excessive medical interference with the natural process of dying.
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In recent decades government has increasingly disrupted and dis-
placed the fundamental economic relationship between patients and their
doctors. I will suggest in Part IT of this Article that refusing to legalize as-
sisted suicide, while prudent in itself, may do little to prevent euthanasia
from becoming a common practice. This analysis should disquiet those.
who are skeptical-even in the face of the evidence from the Nether-
lands-about the slippery slope argument presented above. They should
ask themselves why it is that after so many centuries the Hippocratic ban
on assisted suicide has only now come under serious attack. The answer, I
suggest, is not that people are slapping their foreheads as they suddenly
wake up to an obvious implication of the ideal of patient autonomy. Nor is
it simply a matter of a natural revulsion to the over-medicalized deaths that
new technologies have made possible. The most significant new develop-
ment has been that large numbers of people have acquired strong, new
material interests in preventing other people from running up large health
care bills. Those material interests, which are largely the result of identifi-
able government policies, would be served at least as well by coerced
euthanasia as by assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia.
H. Managed Care and Euthanasia
All forms of euthanasia are inconsistent with traditional Hippocratic
medical ethics, under which physicians are required to apply their exper-
tise solely to restoring their patients' health and to providing comfort when
efforts to restore health become futile. Doctors are permitted, indeed re-
quired, to refrain from treating patients without their consent. 3 Further,
they are permitted, and even required, to refrain from subjecting consent-
ing patients to useless treatments, whether because such treatments are fi-
nancially profitable to the doctor or in order to satisfy some other personal
motive such as an urge to avoid being "defeated" by the patient's disease.
For all its virtues, however, the Hippocratic Oath never did, and never
could, prevent physicians from having and acting on personal motives.
The Hippocratic tradition lowers agency costs in the doctor-patient rela-
tionship, but it does not reduce them to zero.
One obvious stubborn temptation that doctors face is to increase their
income by overtreating their patients. This temptation has particular rele-
vance to the debate over assisted suicide because so many people fear that
they will be overtreated at the end of their lives. For the reasons set out in
73. For obvious reasons, physicians are permitted to give emergency treatments until the
patient becomes capable of giving or withholding consent.
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Part I above, legalizing assisted suicide is not an auspicious device for ad-
dressing the problem74 The problem, however, is a real one and it de-
serves careful consideration. A recent 9tudy, for example, has shown that
people are much more likely to die in a hospital, and much more likely to
undergo intensive-care treatment, in some geographic locations than in
others.75 This pattern strongly suggests that economic considerations, such
as a desire to keep hospitals operating at optimal capacity, are driving deci-
sions about the care of patients at the end of life! 6 People justifiably find
it highly objectionable that they and their loved ones should be subjected
to highly medicalized deaths in order to enich the medical profession, and
it is likely that this often occurs.
The best way to begin thinking about this problem, and about how to
address it, is not in isolation but as part of a larger picture of health care
financing. Until fairly recently, patients had much the same economic re-
lationship with their doctors that they have with most others from whom
they purchase personal services: individual patients and individual physi-
cians bargained with each other, either explicitly or implicitly, until they
reached an agreement as to what services the patient would purchase and at
what price. As doctors became politically organized, they acquired and
exercised the ability to raise prices through the usual means, such as price
fixing and the creation of governmentally enforced barriers to entry into
the profession 7 Indeed, there is good reason to regard the American
medical profession as one of the most spectacularly successful cartels in
history.8 Whatever inefficiencies resulted from this success, however, it
74. As Professor Hendin points out, the same desire to "defeat the disease!' that sometimes
leads physicians to overtreat dying patients might well also lead them to use assisted-suicide and
euthanasia as a substitute way of coping with the sense of despair they naturally feel in the face
of death. See Herbert Hendin, Suicide and the Request for Assisted Suicide: Meaning and Moti-
vation, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 285,291 n.42 (1996).
75. DARTMOUTH ATLAS OFHEALTHCAE 1998 84-87 (1997).
76. John E. Wennberg, the principal author of the Dartmouth Atlas, concludes that the geo-
graphic differences in where people die reflect "the characteristics of the health care system and
not what patients want or what is best for them." Amy Goldstein, Dying Patients' Care Varies
Widely by Place, Study Says, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1997, at Al, A8.
77. Price-fixing, typically adopted under the guise of professional ethics, goes back at least
to 1766 in this country, and was endorsed in the first code of ethics promulgated by the American
Medical Association in 1847. See FRECH, supra note 20, at 65. Although this practice is now
clearly illegal under the antitrust laws, government regulations continue to restrict the supply of
medical services by erecting artificial barriers to entering the profession. The picture has been
complicated in recent decades by government subsidies for medical education, which have artifi-
cially inflated the supply of trained doctors in some specialty fields, and for hospital construction.
78. Consider, for example, the fact that the number of doctors per capita in the United States
in 1965 was precisely the same as it had been in 1870, despite enormous improvements in the
useful services that doctors could provide and enormous increases in the amount of disposable
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did not fundamentally alter the economic relationship between doctors and
patients. On the whole, patients still decided what medical services to pur-
chase, from whom, and at what price. Because the economic relationship
between doctors and patients was fundamentally controlled by the price
mechanism, albeit under conditions of imperfect competition, medical care
was rationed in basically the same way that other goods and services are
rationed: customers got about as much of what they wanted as they were
willing and able to pay for.
One obvious difference between medical care and most other goods
and services is that strict allocation by the price mechanism can have par-
ticularly harsh effects on impoverished individuals. Medical care, how-
ever, is not unique in this respect, for the same is true of other goods, such
as food and housing. Traditionally, the problem was addressed in the same
way for all such goods: through charity. That approach obviously did not
provide poor people with the level of medical care they wanted. Nor did it
provide them with the same level of medical care as richer people were
able to purchase. But the same can be said about food and housing, and it
would be equally foolish in all these cases to condemn a system because it
failed to provide some with everything they wanted or because it failed to
provide everyone with an equal share of what they wanted. If one believes,
for whatever reason, that the amount of medical care provided to the poor
through charity is going to be intolerably inadequate, the obvious alterna-
tive would be to have the government provide supplements to the poor.
That is what we have done with food and housing, and there is no immedi-
ately obvious reason why medical care should be treated differently.
We have in fact treated medical care very differently. Except for edu-
cation, it is difficult to think of an important consumer service in which the
operation of the price mechanism has been more thoroughly disrupted. In
recent decades, three enormously influential government policies have
transformed the economics of the medical industry. First, large govern-
ment subsidies have promoted a dramatic increase in the types and quanti-
ties of medical care that can be produced. 9 Second, the government has
income available for expenditures on health care. See Cotton M. Lindsay and James M. Bu-
chanan, The Organization and Financing of Medical Care in the United States, in HEALTH
SERvICES FINANCING 538 (Table 1) (1970). As one would expect, physicians' incomes have
skyrocketed. In the mid-nineteenth century, the income of doctors was about twice the average
nonfarm income, and less than the income of skilled manual laborers and craftsmen; in 1991, the
average physician earned $170,600 while average annual income was $32,649. See FRECH, su-
pra note 20, at51.
79. Government funding, of course, has not been solely responsible for recent advances in
medicine. Nevertheless, even those developments that seem to have come primarily from the pri-
vate sector (in pharmaceutical research, for example) have presumably been stimulated in part by
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begun paying the medical bills for a much larger portion of the population
than it does with respect to other basic requirements of life, such as food
and shelter. Third, the government has promoted and regulated group
health care insurance so as to create incentives for consumers that are very
different than would otherwise exist.
The most obvious and immediate effect of these policies was to re-
duce the incentives for physicians and families to hasten the deaths of their
patients and loved ones, just at the time when technological developments
were offering increasingly elaborate ways of keeping very sick people
alive. To the extent that doctors get paid more for providing more treat-
ment, they will not have a financial motive to look for ways of getting rid
of the person who is causing the money to flow in, especially when the ap-
pearance of undertreatment may trigger liability in tort. Similarly, when
family members do not have to foot the bills, they need not cope with the
insidious conflicts of interest that would otherwise exist. It is very likely
true that many patients have been and still are being subjected to painful,
degrading and pointless medical treatments near the end of life as a direct
result of perverse incentives created by government's heavy involvement
in health care financing. It should be no surprise that rational people,
many of whom have witnessed this phenomenon in their own families,
should believe that patients and families should be given the power to stop
this sort of thing from happening.
Were this the end of the story, it might be difficult to defend the con-
tinuing usefulness of the Hippocratic ethic's ban on assisted suicide and
voluntary euthanasia. The initial and obvious effects of government's new
role in medicine, however, are merely part of a larger phenomenon in
which the general problem of overtreatment is rapidly causing its opposite:
problems of selective undertreatment. The current "crisis" in medical
costs is largely a result of government policies, as is the resulting search
(in both the private and public sectors) for ways to cut costs. There is now
a gigantic literature on the subject of a health care financing, along with a
myriad of contending theories and proposals for reform. Two relatively
narrow aspects of the subject are particularly germane to the assisted sui-
cide debate: first, the nature and effect of the changes that have occurred in
the physician-patient relationship; and second, the increased politicization
of decisions about the allocation of medical resources. Before turning to
those questions, however, a brief description of the rise of government in-
volvement is in order.
government programs that inflated demand by funding the purchase of products that would oth-
erwise not have found a market sufficient to pay the costs of development.
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A. The Invasion of Government
For most of history, medicine was a relatively insignificant portion of
the economy because the providers of medical services did not really have
very much to offer. As the Hippocratic Oath suggests with its reference to
"dietetic measures," the distinction between professional medicine on one
hand and common sense and folk remedies on the other would for a long
time have been difficult to draw on technical grounds. In fact, what we
think of as scientific medicine is a recent development. Less than two
centuries ago, standard treatments prescribed by orthodox medicine for
most maladies included bleeding patients until they lost consciousness,
purging the digestive system with laxatives, and administering powerful
poisons such as mercury.80
, As a more scientific basis for medicine began to develop, a new kind
of professionalism--one distinct from the ethical professionalism symbol-
ized by the Hippocratic Oath-became possible. This new professionalism
was based largely on high levels of formal education, and it thus became
important for physicians who made a large investment in education to dis-
tinguish themselves in the marketplace from "quacks" (i.e., medical practi-
tioners who had not made the same investment). If these investments had
all the value customarily attributed to them by doctors, scientifically edu-
cated physicians should have driven their competitors out of business sim-
ply by virtue of the superiority of their services. That did not happen.81
Instead, doctors organized politically and induced state governments to
impose licensing requirements that excluded their competitors from medi-
cal practice, and they used this power to restrict entry into the guild by
"raising standards" at the medical schools.8 2 By 1930, the medical guild
had achieved dominance.8 3
Although this system might not have proved durable unless the edu-
cation provided by medical colleges enabled physicians to provide signifi-
cant benefits to their patients, the system also enables physicians to charge
80. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIALTRANSFORMATONOF AMIcAN MEDICINE 42 (1982).
81. Formal education, it should be emphasized, does not necessarily imply that what is
learned is valid. Scientific progress has not prevented scientifically unverified theories like phre-
nology and Freudian psychotherapy from becoming popular among orthodox medical practitio-
ners. This suggests a possible alternative definition of "quacks:" medical practitioners who find
more favor with their patients than they do with their competitors.
82. For a detailed study of this process, see STARR, supra note 80, at 79-144. High stan-
dards for those actually practicing have apparently been of less concern. See, e.g., Reuben A.
Kessel, The A.M.A. and the Supply of Physicians, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 267,275 (1970)
("Once a doctor wins a license to practice, it is almost never revoked unless he is convicted of
law-breaking.").
83. See FRECH, supra note 20, at 53-54; see also STARR, supra note 80, at 127.
[Vol. 24.'903
higher prices than they could if they were subjected to unregulated compe-
tition from uncredentialed medical practitioners. Although medicine is not
a monopoly in the strictest sense (because individual physicians compete
against one another), competition is imperfect because entry into the com-
petitive arena is artificially restricted by the government. Whatever the
magnitude of the inefficiencies created by these licensing requirements
may be, however, they did not by themselves fundamentally alter the basic
market system for allocating medical care through the price mechanism. In
recent decades that basic system has finally begun to change: at least three
large and essentially different kinds of government influence have now
caused fundamental alterations in the practice of medicine.
1. Government-Funded Research
Although it may. seem churlish even to mention the fact, the federal
government has interfered significantly with market forces since World
War I1 by injecting large quantities of tax dollars into medical research.84
To whatever extent this money has simply been wasted-by overpaying
medical researchers, for example, or by pursuing frivolous or ill-conceived
research projects-one might say that this is an unfortunate but acceptable
tradeoff for the advances in medical knowledge and technique that the
funding has produced. But this is not the only obvious tradeoff. The same
expanded body of knowledge and technique that seems unambiguously
beneficial to a patient who finds himself cured of an illness from which he
might well have died during his grandparents' time has also created many
of the dilemmas about terminating treatment that form the backdrop to the
debate about assisted suicide and euthanasia. Where one's parent may
have seen his own father die quietly and naturally of pneumonia, one may
now have to face agonizing questions about whether and when to have that
same parent disconnected from an artificial ventilator. The pain caused by
such questions has to count as a cost-though perhaps we should regard it
as a small cost-of medical progress.
A more complicated side effect of the large infusion of federal fund-
ing in the post-war era has to do with the institutions of medical education.
Much of this money has been funneled through medical schools and the
"teaching hospitals" with which they are associated8 5 The sums of money
84. See, e.g., Helen Leskovac, Academic Freedom and the Quality of Sponsored Research
on Campus, 13 REV. L1TIG. 401,404-05 (1994).
85. See, e.g., Ernest Moy et al., Relationship Between National Institutes of Health Re-
search Awards to US Medical Schools and Managed Care Market Penetration, 278 JAMA 217,
218 (July 16, 1997) ("Approximately 80% of federal support for health-related research and de-
velopment is distributed by the NIH [National Institutes for Health]. Medical schools receive the
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that flowed into academic medicine were sufficiently large to make every-
one involved quite happy. Clinical faculty were paid high salaries to do
interesting work. Students received subsidized educations leading to ex-
tremely lucrative careers in which they could regard themselves, largely
without fear of contradiction, as noble humanitarians. And indigent pa-
tients served by the hospitals began receiving a level of care that many
wealthy people might have envied only a short time earlier. When the flow
of money contracted in the 1970's, however, underlying problems began to
come to light.86 Institutions that had grown rich on government grants had
predictably failed to discipline themselves as participants in markets must.
Many apparently did not even use accurate accounting systems, and were
ignorant of the costs of the services they provided. By producing a steady
stream of highly trained specialists, moreover, they fostered the creation of
sophisticated medical centers where there had once been only community
medical hospitals; and the federal government aggravated this phenomenon
by funding a massive program of hospital construction. Because the mar-
ket for many specialized services is inherently limited, significant compe-
tition for patients among geographically dispersed medical centers arose.
When the federal government began imposing cost-control measures in the
Medicare and Medicaid programs in the 1980's, and private insurers began
to do the same, even the most prestigious medical centers were forced into
the real world of scarce resources and hard choices.
The intrusion of reality into academic medicine has not, or at least not
yet, produced a simple reversal of the artificial institutional growth that
federal funding had caused. Instead, existing institutions have attempted to
cope with the reduction in resources primarily by cutting costs. This cost-
cutting could in theory be accomplished by reducing the compensation of
the doctors and administrators who run these institutions or by reducing
the level of care provided to patients. It is a safe bet that academic medi-
cine is insufficiently populated with genuine humanitarians to make the
first option the first and only choice.
2. Medicare and Medicaid
If government had merely created a temporary spike in the level of
medical care available to indigent patients who had the good luck to live
near teaching hospitals, a subsequent reduction in that level of care might
majority of their sponsored research funding from NIH, and about 50% of all NIH research grants
are awarded to medical schools." (footnotes omitted)).
86. For the more detailed discussion on which this summary is based, see Bruce A. Barron,
The Price of Managed Care, CoMMENTARY, May 1997, at 49.
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have had relatively limited effects. More profound changes in the medical
system during the post-war period, however, have produced similar pat-
terns on a larger scale. With the rise of the Medicare and Medicaid sys-
tems, government has assumed responsibility for providing medical serv-
ices to a very large fraction of the population, far beyond the class of
persons who could be considered indigent8 7
For the truly indigent, it may be safe to assume that these government
programs will finance a higher level of care than patients would receive if
they had to depend on charity. If that assumption is correct, there is no ob-
vious reason to suppose that the very poor have been made worse off in
any way by the programs' growth. For the rest of the population, however,
the case for government financing is less clear. Most obviously, patients
lose a significant amount of autonomy when they send their health care
dollars to the government, which in turn pays doctors and hospitals for
their medical care. Patients who are not responsible for paying their own
medical bills have a strong incentive to demand much more expensive
medical care than they would demand if they were paying for the services
directly; or, to put the same point differently, patients have little incentive
to resist "buying" the most expensive treatments doctors have to sell. The
government, in turn, is inevitably forced to devise mechanisms for frus-
trating these demands. Today, those mechanisms go by the names of cost
containment and managed care. In individual cases, some patients no
doubt receive a higher level of care than they would if the market were ra-
tioning medical services through the price mechanism. But in other cases,
patients will be worse off because they could have spent the money that the
government takes away in taxes more effectively than it is spent under the
government's rationing system. And all these patients have lost an impor-
tant source of power over their doctors, for whom the government rather
than the patient has now become the paying customer.
3. Private Insurance and the Tax System
Federal intervention in the doctor-patient relationship has not been
confined to those programs in which the government itself takes on the role
of paying customer. Perhaps even more important, federal policies have
created irresistible incentives for a dramatic growth in certain forms of pri-
87. See Stephen Wood et al., Planning Strategy for Managed Care in Medicare, Medicaid,
MANAGED MEDICARE & MEDICAID, Dec. 1996, at 1996 WL 15558265 ("the percentage of the
population covered by government medical programs now stands at 29% and will continue to
grow").
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vate group insurance plans. 88 This development should be considered par-
ticularly questionable because it was probably the result, at least in part, of
inadvertence.
Health insurance, like many other forms of insurance, has double-
edged effects. The principal purpose of most insurance is to benefit con-
sumers through risk-spreading. If, for example, there is a small but non-
negligible chance that my house will be struck by lightning and destroyed,
a group insurance policy enables me and others to exchange a small annual
fee in return for the assurance that none of us will be wiped out financially
by a catastrophic lightning strike. Similarly, health insurance can spread
the risk of relatively rare but costly illnesses. Unlike lightning insurance,
however, excessive health insurance creates significant moral hazards. If,
for example, I were the beneficiary of a policy that provided 100 percent
coverage for any available medical service, an incentive would be created
for me and all the other policyholders to consume medical services far in
excess of what we would be willing to pay for ourselves. Because doctors
can now supply a tremendous range of diagnostic and therapeutic services,
the operation of these incentives.would quickly make the policy so expen-
sive that it would become unsaleable.89 Where a significant potential for
moral hazard exists, insurance companies try to compensate with devices
such as deductibles and coinsurance. There is, however, no general for-
mula that dictates where to find the most efficient tradeoffs between these
devices and the underlying risk-spreading purpose of the insurance. Those
insurance products that survive in a freely competitive, market presumably
represent the best approximation of whatever the ideal tradeoff may be.
Prior to government intervention, medical insurance policies did exist,
but they did not dominate the market as they do now. The first modem
group health plan, offered in 1910, paid benefits directly to disabled em-
ployees as a percentage of salary.9° In 1929, only 12 percent of health care
bills were paid by public or private insurers,91 and plans including direct
payments-to health-care providers apparently arose only in response to
economic dislocations caused by the Great Depression.92 Today, of course,
88. For the sake of simplicity, the following brief summary ignores the effects of state
regulatiorif on private health insurance. This phenomenon is discussed in JOHN C. GOODMAN &
GERALD L. MUSGRAVE, PATIENT POWER: SOLVING AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE CRISis 323-53
(1992).
89. Even lightning insurance presumably creates incentives for policyholders to skimp on
precautions like lightning rods, but the magnitude of the economic effects is probably quite small.
90. See Laura A. Scofea, The Development and Growth of Employer-Provided Health In-
surance, MONTHLYLAB. REV., Mar. 1994, at3, 4.
91. See FRECH, supra note 20, at 9. The comparable figure for 1991 is 78%. Id.
92. See Scofea, supra note 90, at 5.
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third-party payment systems are completely dominant. This has not, how-
ever, occurred through the operation of market forces.
On the contrary, the dramatic growth in the medical insurance indus-
try owes its origins largely to a 1942 statute that tried to restrain normal
wartime inflation by limiting the freedom of employers to grant wage in-
creases to their employees.93 Because Congress is a mere legislature,
without the power to alter the laws of supply and demand, this statute sim-
ply created an incentive for employers to compete for workers by increas-
ing the non-wage compensation of their employees. And the 1942 statute
was helpfully interpreted to exempt health-care coverage from the wage
controls; such coverage was then quickly adopted on a large scale in col-
lective bargaining agreements.9a The removal of the wartime wage control
rules might have permitted a return to more normal compensation ar-
rangements except that employers had treated medical payments as exempt
from the withholding tax. s By the time the IRS finally objected, the tax
subsidy for employer-provided health insurance had become so popular
that Congress was forced to grant it a statutory tax exemption. 6 The result
was inevitable. Because this kind of health insurance system was subsi-
dized, excessive amounts of insurance were demanded and serious moral
hazard problems were created. Eventually, the costs became intolerably
high, and cost controls began being imposed. Just as in programs that in-
volve direct government payment, the patient is no longer the paying cus-
tomer, and physicians are increasingly responsive to the cost-cutting de-
mands of the paying customer rather than to the patient. We encounter the
result as "managed care," which might be better called "not-managed-by-
us-care."
97
93. See Scofea, supra note 90, at 6. Another factor, though one that has less continuing
relevance today, was political manipulation at the state level by organized medicine. See
GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, supra note 88, at 153-55, 158-61.
94. See Scofea, supra note 90, at 6. See also Paul L Donahue, Federal Tax Treatment of
Health Care Expenditures: Is It Part of the Health Care Problem?, 46 WAsH. UJ. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 141, 142-43 (1994).
95. See Milton Friedman, A Way Out of Soviet-Style Health Care, WALL ST. L, Apr. 17,
1996, at A20.
96. See id. See also Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Nondiscrimination in Employee Benefits: False
Starts and Future Trends, 52 TENN. L. REv. 167, 169 n.5 (1985) ("The exclusion of em-
ployer-provided medical insurance and amounts received thereunder was enacted with the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1954. LR.C. §§ 105(b), 106 (1954) (current version at I.RC. §§ 105(b),
106 (1982 & West 1985)).!); H. Rep. 83-1337, 83rd Cong. 2nd Sess. (1954), 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4017, 4039-40, 4169-71; S. Rep. 83-1622, 83rd Cong., 2nd Seas. (1954), 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4621, 4645-46,4817-20.
97. As of 1993, only 4% of the health insurance market involved unmanaged fee-for-service
coverage. See American Medical Association, TRENDS iN US HEALTH CARE 95 (4th ed. 1995).
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B. Managed Care at the End of Life
The public debate is awash in proposals for dealing with the escala-
tion in health care costs that has resulted largely from the government poli-
cies briefly described above. Most of these proposals entail more govern-
ment regulation of the market for medical services. With respect to the
issues of assisted suicide and euthanasia, this is an unsettling prospect be-
cause the only real alternative to allocating medical care through the price
mechanism is to allocate it by political criteria. Whether those criteria are
applied directly through law and regulation, or through the development of
a sort of customary law by proxies in the health care industry, they are
likely to produce significant new pressures for withholding care from pa-
tients whose lives are deemed insufficiently worthy of continuation.
The increasingly political nature of health care rationing is the inevi-
table result of displacing the price mechanism. Recent instances of the di-
rect politicization of medical decisionmaking are not hard to find. Con-
gress, for example, has now decreed that insurers must allow women to
stay in a hospital for at least 48 hours after giving birth.98 This statute was
a reaction to a clever slogan-Stop "drive-by deliveries"!-that subtly lik-
ened cost-conscious insurance companies to the gangsters who commit
"drive-by shootings." What politician could resist the urge to defend
motherhood itself from such murderous depredations?99 But the inevitable
result of the statute, in a world of limited medical resources, is to deprive
other patients of resources that must now be committed to newborn chil-
dren and their mothers. Nothing in the statute ensures that these resources
will be diverted from patients who need care less than the politically ap-
pealing women and children who are its beneficiaries.
Similarly, the state of Oregon adopted a Medicaid rationing plan that
ranked several hundred different medical treatments; funds for lower
rhnking treatments are withheld so that everyone needing one of the higher
ranking treatments can be served with available funds.1' When the plan
was first proposed, treatments meant to attempt a cure for patients in the
late stages of AIDS were given a low ranking because such treatments
were expensive and largely unsuccessful. In response, the AIDS lobby
mounted a successful political campaign to get the plan amended so as to
98. Pub. L. 104-204 § 602 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4) (Sup. 1997).
99. See, e.g., Barbara Vobejda, "Moms and Babies" Prove to be Irresistible Force on
Capitol Hill, WASH. POST, Sept 20, 1996, at A17.
100. See OR. RBV. STAT. § 414.705 to .750 (1991). See also Nancy K. Stade, The Use of
Qualiy-of-Life Measures to Ration Health Care: Reviving a Rejected Proposal, 93 COLUM. L.
REv. 1985 (1993).
HASTINGS CONSTIUTONAL LAW OUARTERLY rVol. 24:903
protect the interests of these patients. 1 ' Analogous groups of patients for
whom expensive but largely unsuccessful treatments are available, such as
low birth weight babies and advanced cancer patients, continue to have
funds withheld under the Oregon plan for the simple reason that they are
politically less powerful. 1'7
Examples like these are bound to multiply as access to medical care
becomes the subject of explicit bargaining in the political arena. And it is
not hard to imagine some of the outcomes that might result. The likely
winners will include the most politically well-organized and appealing
groups of patients. A campaign against "drive-by mastectomies" has al-
ready been mounted,103 and it would be no surprise to see similar cam-
paigns on behalf of patients suffering from diseases that disproportionately
affect certain racial and ethnic groups.104 Some occupations are also af-
fected disproportionately by specific illnesses, and perhaps their unions
might take up the cudgels for their members. Where campaigns like these
produce winners, others must lose. Often, the losses will be distributed
widely and invisibly, but the government is also capable of picking losers
when the targets are sufficiently unpopular. Leading candidates might in-
clude those suffering from illnesses linked to cigarette smoking, illegal
drugs, motorcycle riding, or liquor. Eventually, perhaps we might even
consider curtailing health care to the obese, the sedentary, those with a
taste for high-fat foods and red meat, or people who drive without seat
belts or atspeeds exceeding the legal limit. As the recent publicity about
forced sterilization in Sweden suggests, even governments that fancy
themselves paragons of enlightened humanitarianism are perfectly capable
101. See SM-rH, supra note 34, at 87.
102. See d. For evidence that AIDS policies in general redistribute wealth from the general
population to male homosexuals and medical professionals, see TOMAS I. PHLISON & RICHARD
A. POSNER, PRIVATE CHOICES AND PUBUC HEALTH: THE AIDS EPIDEMIC IN AN ECONOMIC
PERSPpECIVE 199-206 (1993).
103. See, e.g., Sandra Sobieraj, First Lady Pushes Ban on "Drive-by" Mastectomies,
ASSOCIATED PRESS POLmCAL SERVICE, Feb. 12, 1997; Charles Krauthammer, Play Doctors on
the Hill, WASH. PoST, Feb. 14, 1997, at A21; Lynn Lauerman, Mandated 2-Day Stay after Mas-
tectomy Debated; Committee Hears of No Rush Cases in Virginia, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH,
June 18, 1997, at B5; Amy Goldstein, Under the Scalpel, then Out the Door; Rise in Outpatient
Masectomies Drives Legislation but Little Basic Research, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 1997, at Al.
104. This is not mere speculation. Medical criteria for the allocation of transplant organs
have already begun to be displaced by rules based on theories of "racial justice." See Lloyd R.
Cohen and Melisa Michelsen, The Efficiency/Equity Puzzle and the Race Issue in Kidney Allo-
cation: A Reply toAyres, etaL and UNOS, 4 ANNUALREV. OPLAw AND ETHIcs 137 (1996).
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of adopting barbaric medical practices directed at the politically unpopu-
lar.105
It is, of course, quite possible that legislatures will shrink from en-
gaging in the sort of explicit rationing just suggested. If so, however, the
difficult and essentially political decisions about allocating limited medical
resources will simply be shifted to other decisionmakers. Doctors and
health care administrators, provided with limited budgets and under con-
stant pressure to keep within those budgets, will have virtually no choice
except to withhold care from some people in order to conserve resources
for other patients whom the decisionmakers regard as more "deserving" or
more "promising." As these decisions are played out in practice, the line
between withholding care and committing euthanasia is bound to blur, and
perhaps ultimately to disappear.
Consider, for example, the phenomenon known as the persistent
vegetative state, which is sometimes referred to as a permanent vegetative
state when it is "deemed" irreversible. Leaving aside the odd fact that
doctors now liken some of their patients to carrots and broccoli, one of the
most striking characteristics of this condition is how poorly the medical
profession understands it. The vegetative state has traditionally been de-
fined as "the absence of any adaptive response to the external environ-
ment. 1 °6 But patients diagnosed as persistently vegetative often regain
consciousness. 1' 7 Indeed, even patients in a permanent vegetative state
105. See, e.g., Dan Balz, Sweden Sterilized Thousands of "Useless" Citizens for Decades,
WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1997, at Al (from 1934 to 1974, 62,000 Swedes were sterilized by the
state, often against their will). Balz notes:
[There was nothing secret about the sterilization program. It was carried out in the
light of public debate at a time when Swedes believed they were creating a society that
would be the envy of the world.... Politicians in Sweden defended the program as a
way to hold down the costs of the enlarging welfare state. They argued that it was im-
portant to limit the size of families, especially those with a history of antisocial behav-
ior. [Researcher Maija] Runcis said the Social Democrats "argued that it was neces-
sary to sterilize people who got a lot of benefits from the welfare state because the
welfare state was only for people who behaved themselves.
106. See Brian Jennett and Fred Plum, Persistent Vegetative State after Brain Damage, 1
LANCEr 734,736 (1972).
107. See, e.g., Harvey S. Levin, Christy Saydjari, Howard M. Eisenberg, Mary Foulkes, Law-
rence F. Marshall, Ronald M. Ruff, John A. Jane, and Anthony Marmarou, Vegetative State after
Closed-Head Injury: A Traumatic Coma Data Bank Report, 48 ARCHIvES OF NEUROLOGY 580
(1991) ("Of 84 patients in a vegetative state who provided follow-up data, 41% became con-
scious by 6 months, 52% regained consciousness by 1 year, and 58% recovered consciousness
within the 3-year follow-up interval.'). For those inclined to put their faith in doctors who
"deem" some comas irreversible, it is worth noting that the authors of this study report that "[a]
logistic regression failed to identify predictors of recovery from the vegetative state." Id.
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often experience periods of wakefulness. 08 Patients who have been unre-
sponsive to external stimuli, moreover, frequently report upon recovery
that they had in fact been conscious, even though they had been incapable
of showing any signs of awareness.1°9
As the controversy about Cruzan suggests, 10 considerable sentiment
exists for the practice of withholding food and water from patients suffer-
ing prolonged apparent unconsciousness."' This sentiment, moreover, is
not confined to lay persons unfamiliar with the paucity of medical under-
standing about the condition. In 1994, for example, the executive editor of
the prestigious New England Journal of Medicine published an editorial
recommending that steps be taken to protect "demoralized" caregivers
108. See Marcia Angell, After Quinlan: The Dilemma of the Persistent Vegetative State, 330
NEwIENG. J. oFMED. 1524, 1525 (1994).
109. See, e.g., Madelaine Lawrence, The Unconscious Experience, 4 AM. J. OF CRrrIcAL
CARE 227 (1995). At least 27% of the subjects in Dr. Lawrence's study "were able to hear, un-
derstand, and respond emotionally at some time to what was being said but were unable to re-
spond physically or communicate:' Id. at 229. Because amnesia is a well-documented occur-
rence among people who are unquestionably conscious, such statistics might radically
underestimate the number of apparently unconscious people who are actually aware of their sur-
roundings.
110. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Health Dept., 497 U.S. 261 (1990). In this case, the Court held
that state governments are constitutionally permitted to require that life-sustaining treatment be
withdrawn from an incompetent patient only upon proof, by clear and convincing evidence, that
such withdrawal was consistent with the patient's previously expressed wishes. Four members of
the Court, however, dissented. See id. at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (contending that this pro-
cedural requirement imposes an unconstitutional burden on the patient's right to avoid unwanted
medical treatment); id. at 356 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "meaning and completion
of [an incompetent patient's] life should be controlled by persons who have her best interests at
heart-not by a state legislature concerned only with the 'preservation of human life"). Justice
Brennan's dissent, which was joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, noted the results of a
survey suggesting that a large majority of the population approved of withdrawing life-support
systems "from hopelessly ill or irreversibly comatose patients if they or their families requested
it." Id. at 312 n.lI (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
111. A considerable amount of confusion and sophistry has arisen In connection with discus-
sions of the use of feeding tubes and intravenous hydration. To say that failing to provide artifi-
cial feeding and hydration to patients who cannot be fed orally always constitutes "murder by
starvation" implies that physicians must always take every step possible to delay the moment at
which every patient becomes technically dead, even when such steps can only impose pointless
suffering on the patient. But to say that artificial feeding and hydration can be withheld at any
time and for any reason, even when the patient can easily be restored to health, is no different
from the ancient sophistry that allowed parents to expose unwanted infants to the elements on the
rationale that they were being killed by the weather rather than by their parents. Under traditional
medical ethics, artificial feeding-like other medical procedures-should be used when medical
judgment indicates that it may help the patient, but not when it merely constitutes a burdensome
interference with the natural process of dying. See Kass & Lund, supra note *, at 422 n.45. The
fact that such judgments can be very difficult to make is not a sufficient reason to substitute non-
medical criteria or to engage in sophistries meant to blur the distinction between choosing a pa-
tient's death and accepting the inevitability of a patient's death.
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from having to provide wasteful treatment to such patients.11 2 The editor,
Dr. Marcia Angell, offered three options: 1) redefine death to include per-
manent vegetative states, and withhold food from the "dead" person until
the heart and lungs stop; 2) enact legislation prohibiting the delivery of
medical care (including food) to a person who has been unconscious for a
specified period of time; 3) create a legal presumption that a person who
remains unconscious for a specified period of time would refuse further
treatment (including food). Dr. Angell personally recommended the third
option, but all of the alternatives are clearly driven by the same impulse: to
conserve resources (including the morale of overburdened caregivers) by
denying medical treatment (now defined to include food) to patients whose
quality of life appears insufficient to justify further expenditures.
This sort of quality-of-life calculus has already been applied in other
contexts, such as that of disabled children,113 and there is nothing in prin-
ciple to stop it from being used to deny expensive medical care to count-
less patients who are fully competent and unwilling to request a hastened
death. Nor is it clear that the medical profession and its new overseers in
the managed care industry necessarily need wait for express legal authori-
zation to begin allocating care on the basis of such calculations. Instead,
they may be able simply to redefine the concept of "futile care" so as to
create opportunities for hastening the deaths of patients they do not want to
treat.
114
It is obviously appropriate, and perhaps even mandatory, for physi-
cians to refuse to provide treatments that would be medically futile, even if
the patient wants them. If, for example, a patient mistakenly believes that
his insomnia would be cured by having his feet amputated, such a request
should certainly be refused. Or, to take a less outlandish example, physi-
cians are perfectly right when they refuse to prescribe antibiotics for pa-
tients with viral infections. Such refusals are based on medical judgments
about futility. By expanding the concept of futility to cover treatments that
are perfectly appropriate under normal medical standards, physicians could
112. See Angell, supra note 108. The editorial poses the question: "Do care givers-demor-
alized by providing limitless, expensive care in a hopeless case-have the right to stop treatment
aftyway, so that the patient will die?" Id. at 1524.
113. See, e.g., Nelson Lund, Infanticide, Physicians, and the Law: The 'Baby Doe' Amend-
ments to the ChildAbuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 11 AM. I. L. & MED. 1 (1985).
114. Even without a development like this, the legalization of assisted suicide may encourage
managed care organizations to undertreat depression, which is a significant cause of requests for
assisted suicide. Because depression (accompanied by suicidal wishes) often manifests itself
relatively early in the course of diseases like cancer and AIDS, this could be a significant source
of cost savings. See Susan M. Wolf, Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Context of Managed
Care, 35 DUQ. L. REv. 455 (1996).
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institute a regime of de facto euthanasia governed by essentially political
criteria. This possibility is not mere speculation. One of the nation's
leading specialists in bioethics has proposed that medical treatments be
stopped under the following circumstances:
" when there is a likely, though not necessarily certain, downward
course of an illness, making death a strong possibility; failure of
more than one organ is an obvious example in an older patient
* when the available treatments for a potentially fatal condition entail
a significant likelihood of extended pain or suffering
" when successful treatment is more likely to bring extended uncon-
sciousness or advanced dementia than cure or significant ameliora-
tion
* when, whatever the medical condition, the available treatments sig-
nificantly increase the probability of a bad death, even if they also
promise to extend life.1
Recall that medical treatment does not merely include the vast array
of expensive procedures and mysterious machines that we often think of
with dread under the rubric of "heroic measures." It also includes such
simple things as antibiotics for infections, and even the provision of food
and water to patients who cannot feed themselves. Euthanasia is truly a
euphemism when used to describe the deliberate starvation or dehydration
of infant children or extremely debilitated elderly people. Under guide-
lines like the first one on Dr. Callahan's list, the desired goal of hastened
death could be achieved surely enough through dehydration, but its accel-
eration would not be matched by its mercifulness. Once doctors begin
making choices like these for their patients, assisted suicide and deliber-
ately administered doses of genuinely quick-acting poisons may well be
preferable from the patients' point of view.
Dr. Callahan does not recommend that the medical profession begin to
implement his proposed standards immediately or unilaterally.116 But he
does believe that medical care should be withheld on the basis of quality-
of-life criteria.117 Because the definition of appropriate medical standards
is largely determined by the medical profession itself, the law may not im-
pose insuperable obstacles to a gradual movement in the direction recom-
mended by Dr. Callahan. And, as doctors increasingly come under various
kinds of pressure to cut costs, there is little reason to believe that they will
long resist the urge to move in that direction. Neither doctors nor families
115. See DAiEL CALLAHAN, THE TouBtLED DREAM O LIFE: LIVING wrrH MORTALITY
201-02(1993).
116. See id. at 215-17.
117. Id.
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much enjoy caring for people whom no one expects to recover, especially
when the patient inconsiderately takes a long time to succumb. "We can't
afford to keep such cases alive" will be the irresistible rationale for not
keeping them alive, even if decisions to hasten death are camouflaged with
high-minded expressions of solicitude for the patient's dignity. By the
time the rest of us notice what has happened, we may be ready to demand
that the law actually require physicians to supply a "gentle, quick release,"
if the alternative is being abandoned to a miserable death by dehydration or
starvation."
s
Conclusion
Much of the current enthusiasm for legalizing assisted suicide is
driven by a perfectly understandable yearning for patient autonomy and by
an equally understandable reluctance to let the notoriously arrogant medi-
cal profession force us to endure degrading technologically-extended
deaths. Unfortunately, the legalization of assisted suicide would be a big
step down a road that will finally reduce patient autonomy rather than en-
hance it.
Doctors are uniquely empowered by their technical knowledge and by
the nature of their work to kill their fellow citizens without getting caught.
The principal check on that power has been the ancient and durable Hippo-
cratic ethic, which strictly forbids physicians from ever playing any part in
deliberately hastening the death of any patient. That ethic is now under se-
rious attack, at the very moment when strong new financial incentives are
being created for doctors to step out of the narrow role of healer and to
take on a political function--deciding which lives are worth preserving
and which are not-for which they are eminently ri-suited.
In the past, these decisions rarely had to be made either by doctors or
by explicit political choice. The combined effects of the Hippocratic ethic,
the impersonal operation of market forces, and the technical limitations of
the medical art resulted in an allocation of medical care in which nature
and chance dominated human choice. Almost no one would want to re-
verse or retard the progress of medical knowledge and technique. We can
and should, however, reconsider the policies that have displaced the op-
eration of the price mechanism, and give serious attention to the desirabil-
ity of restoring, to the extent possible, the patient's role as the paying cus-
118. Only wishful thinking could lead one to assume that deliberate starvation and dehydra-
tion will be confined to those who are unconscious. For examples of well-documented cases in-
volving conscious patients, see SMITH, supra note 34, at 3942,216-18.
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tomer. Unless that is done, efforts to rescue the Hippocratic ethic from its
present endangered condition may be a lost cause.
It is true, of.course, that this may be a lost cause in any event. No
matter what steps are taken with respect to health care financing, the irre-
versibility of medical technology and knowledge means that we will never
return to the days when most people could afford to buy most of the genu-
inely useful services that doctors had to offer. Nor would it be easy to
overstate the political obstacles confronting any effort to begin dismantling
the huge and complex array of programs, institutions, and subsidies
through which the government now dominates the various markets for
medical services. Nevertheless, it is worth trying to imagine alternatives to
the politicized system of health care rationing toward which we are quickly
headed.
Without pretending to be able to predict exactly what solutions a freer
market would produce, one can note some obvious possibilities that are
more attractive than anything the government is likely to come up with.
First, eliminating the tax subsidy for employer-provided health insurance
and abolishing the various programs under which the government acts as
payor for medical services would create the conditions for the creation of
more efficient insurance products and, perhaps, the creation of health
maintenance organizations that actually respond to consumer preferences.
It might well be that many people would choose to cover routine medical
expenses out of their own pockets, while maintaining insurance for care-
fully defined catastrophic illnesses. Others might prefer more costly prod-
ucts that cover more routine services. Some catastrophic policies might
exclude certain very expensive treatments for some illnesses, and others
might not. In general, wealthier people would no doubt buy more medical
care (especially exotic or high-tech care), just as they now tend to buy
larger (and thus safer) automobiles, more expensive (and perhaps health-
ier) "natural" foods, (more expensive) housing in low-crime neighbor-
hoods, and better dental care. There is nothing obviously wrong with this
outcome, especially in light of the alternative, which is politicized ration-
ing.
What, then, of the truly indigent? Here, there may really be no alter-
native to government rationing, given the decline of charitable institutions.
If, however, a functioning free market in medical care were to exist, it
would provide some potentially very useful cues about the types and levels
of care that people really consider minimally adequate when they have to
reveal their true preferences by spending their own money. Health-care
vouchers, along the lines of food stamps, are an obvious device that could
be used to provide care for the poor without significant economic distor-
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tions. That would be a great improvement over a system in which advo-
cates for the poor can simply say that they, and everyone else, should get
as much medical care as possible.
Free markets cannot solve every problem, in this context any more
than in any other. They cannot, for example, eliminate conflicts of interest
between doctors and patients, or between patients and their families, or
between indigent patients and taxpayers. Nor can they ensure that every-
body gets as much as he wants of everything he wants. What they can do,
in this context as in most others, is allocate limited resources more effi-
ciently than government, and in a way that will often avoid the need for
explicit and costly battles over those resources. 119 As one contemplates
current trends in health care allocation, it is becoming more and more dif-
ficult to suppose that allocation by the government carries benefits that
could outweigh, or even come close to matching, these advantages.
119. See Mark F. Grady, Politicization of Commodities: The Case of Cadaveric Organs, 20
J. CoRP. L. 51, 61 (1995) ("One virtue of market-based systems of allocation is that they do not
require much public discourse.").
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